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Unconstitutionally Male?:  
The Story of United States v. Virginia 
 
Katharine T. Bartlett* 
 
In 1989, a northern Virginia female high school student complained to the U.S. 
Department of Justice that the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) did not accept applica-
tions from women.  Seven years later, in United States v. Virginia,1 the U.S. Supreme 
Court vindicated her complaint, holding that VMI’s exclusion of women was unconstitu-
tional, even after Virginia attempted to save the male-only school by adding a parallel 
program for women at a neighboring all-women’s college.  The story of this case and its 
aftermath exhibits both the muscle of sex discrimination doctrine and its unresolved ten-
sions. 
 
The record in United States v. Virginia does not reflect what drew this anonymous 
applicant to the 150-year-old college.  VMI has a reputation for rigorous academics, es-
pecially in its engineering and science programs.  It is also known for a military-style cul-
ture and regimen, and especially for its unique, “adversative” system of education, which 
combines tortuous “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, . . . minute regulation of behavior, and 
indoctrination of values.”2  A new cadet enters VMI as a “rat,” defined in the “Rat Bible”  
as the “dumbest and lowliest of God’s creatures.3  Rats are put through seven months of 
the “rat line,” a deliberately overwhelming physical and mental leveling process designed 
to humiliate and disorient the student, instill self-doubt, and strip away any sense of indi-
                                                 
* The author thanks Neil Siegel for comments and conversations about this case that helped clarify my own 
thinking, Tom Metzloff for allowing me to participate in some of the interviews he arranged as part of his 
documentary on the VMI case as part of the American Law Documentary Series, and Amelia Ashton for 
superb research assistance. 
1  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
2  United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892–93 (4th Cir. 1992). 
3  The Rat Bible, formally known as The Bullet, is a compendium of basic facts about VMI—its history, 
layout, calendar, student government, and colloquial terms and abbreviations.  It is prepared by the senior 
class and must be memorized in its entirety, and carried by each rat at all times.  See, e.g., The Bullet: The 
Rat Bible for the Rat Mass of the Virginia Military Institute (Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA), 
1997–1998 (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.); See 
also Philippi Strum, Women in the Barracks: The VMI Case and Equal Rights 39 (2002). 
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viduality, favor, or privilege.4  Out of this experience come graduates who are confident 
and extraordinarily loyal to the school.  VMI alumni are leaders in their communities and 
disproportionately influential in the state of Virginia.5  
 
Like the men who sought admission to VMI, the would-be female applicant may 
have been hungry for the intensity of the physical and mental challenge and the leader-
ship opportunities.  She may have longed for membership in a tightly knit community, 
bonded through the shared grueling misery VMI experience.6  Like others who had suc-
ceeded at VMI, she may have had proud family members who attended VMI or been a 
troublesome under-achiever who had squandered other opportunities.7  
 
The VMI story is about the battle between the federal government seeking to gain 
access for an unknown number of women8 to a school that deliberately excluded them.  
From the government’s perspective, the VMI litigation was part of a long, ongoing effort to 
eliminate sex distinctions and gender stereotypes from laws and public institutions.  The 
government did not expect that many women would ever attend VMI.  In this sense, as one 
commentator has written, “the continued existence of an all-male military school in Vir-
ginia may have been more significant for its expressive effects than for the actual depriva-
tion of educational opportunities.”9  The federal government viewed the principle of equal 
treatment as a means of transforming how society viewed and treated women and thus as a 
principle worth continuing to extend.  In addition, the case looked winnable.  As one law-
                                                 
4 See Statement of Elmon T. Gray, May 5, 1989, available from VMI Archives, supra note 3, at 3. [see 
memo]  
5  Strum, supra note 3, at 89.  There were 6 ,000 VMI alumni in 1989, which included “two congressmen, 
two state senators, the former speaker of the House of Delegates, the managing partners of the state’s two 
biggest law firms, and numerous industrialists and investors.”  Id.   
6  See Laura Fairchild Brodie, VMI and the Coming of Women 42 (2001) (describing VMI’s “mixture of 
bonding and bondage”). 
7  A case in point is the superintendent of VMI (analogous to the president at most colleges and universi-
ties) just before and during gender integration, General Josiah Bunting.  Bunting had been a serious disci-
pline problem in high school, who was thrown out of one boarding school after another before finding a 
school that would let him sit for his final exams.  He took to VMI as a student and went on to be one of its 
most successful graduates—a Rhodes Scholar, president of Briarcliff College (an all-female school in New 
York) and Hampden-Sydney College (an all-male college in Virginia), and headmaster of the prestigious 
Lawrenceville Academy in New Jersey where he oversaw the successful introduction of women to the pre-
viously all-male preparatory school.  See John Sedgwick, Guess Who’s Coming to VMI?, Gentleman’s 
Quarterly, July, 1997, at 124; Brodie, supra note 6, at 34; Strum, supra note 3, at 36–39, 101. 
8 The record reveals that 347 women made inquiries about VMI in the two years preceding the lawsuit.  
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996).  
9  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4, 74 (1996). 
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yer who participated in the litigation later put it, “Although VMI’s admission policy might 
have seemed like a small fish, at least it looked liked one that could be shot in a barrel.”10   
 
If the government’s case for the gender integration of VMI was symbolic, lacking 
even a specific named victim or a known set of beneficiaries,11 VMI’s case to keep women 
out could not have been more concrete.  The school was a success story, steeped in rich 
traditions.  Its distinct, holistic teaching philosophy had specific regimens and rituals de-
signed to replace individual ego with an earned sense of accomplishment and group loy-
alty.  It took young men, cut them down, and built them back up as leaders.  Its graduates 
believed fiercely that the presence of the few women who could survive the VMI experi-
ence would destroy it, and they were prepared to fight hard to preserve that priceless insti-
tution.  The federal government’s interference on behalf of some hypothetical women, for 
these advocates, demonstrated “politically-correct” contempt for a proven educational sys-
tem and an honorable way of life.12  
 
Over the course of the litigation, the struggle between these two world views mir-
rored the multiple versions of equality that have animated debates over sex discrimination 
law: 
 
(1) Exclusion of women based on their differences. Virginia’s original justifica-
tion for excluding women from VMI was that women fundamentally differ from men and 
thus that their admission to VMI would ruin the school for men without benefiting wom-
en themselves.  The district court followed this rationale in holding that VMI did not need 
to admit women. 
 
(2) Separate but equal.  The district court’s decision in support of Virginia’s posi-
tion was reversed on appeal, on the ground that it was unconstitutional for Virginia to 
make the unique VMI opportunity available only to men.  Thereafter, VMI worked with 
Mary Baldwin College to develop a parallel, all-female institution with the same general 
                                                 
10  Cornelia T.L. Pillard, United States v. Virginia: The Virginia Military Institute, Where the Men and Men 
(and so are the Women), in Civil Rights Stories 265, 266 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 
2008). 
11  On the significance of having a named plaintiff in the litigation challenging the exclusion of women 
from The Citadel, see Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in The Citadel and VMI Litigation, 19 
Harv. Women’s L.J. 1 (1996). 
12  See George H. Roberts Jr. (Executive Vice President of the VMI Foundation), Supreme Court to Hear 
Case January 17, VMI Alumni Rev., Fall 1995, at 6, 8 (“To our opponents who choose to view themselves 
as victims, VMI is an elevated symbol to be toppled regardless of its cost and without concern for the bene-
fits never to be regained for the women and men for whom such distinctive educations have been forever 
changed.”); see also Interview with Major General Josiah Bunting III, in Princeton, N.J. (June 11, 2008) 
(explaining his view that a culture that had achieved such a high level of efficiency and proven success 
should not have been put at risk); Strum, supra note 3, at 131 (“Partisans of an all-male VMI considered the 
idea of a gender-integrated military institute to be the reflection of laughable notions about women’s equal-
ity.”). 
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purpose as VMI.  The concept for separate but equal single-sex institutions was approved 
by both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 
(3) Assimilation based on women’s similarities to men.  The United States argued, 
and the Supreme Court ultimately held, that VMI’s exclusion of women was based on 
gender stereotypes, that the two separate programs were not substantially equal, and thus 
that the exclusion of women from VMI was unconstitutional.  
 
(4) Accommodation to women’s differences.  Although the United States had in-
sisted during the litigation that the admission of women would not require any significant 
changes to VMI, once the process of women’s assimilation began, the United States 
sought modifications to the VMI program to enable women to obtain equal benefit from a 
VMI education. 
 
(5) Unconstitutionally male. Another view of equality was not argued explicitly 
by any party nor adopted by any court in the litigation, but glimpses of it emerged 
throughout the litigation.  This view saw beyond VMI’s exclusion of women to the prob-
lem that the “unique” methodology that defined this state-supported institution was 
grounded in an ideology of male superiority.  The assumption that women did not have 
the strength, discipline, endurance, character, or loyalty to succeed at VMI was more than 
an excuse not to admit them; it was a critical motivational component of VMI’s unique 
adversative methodology.  By this view of the case, the problem was less that women 
were missing out on something than that the education available to men was based on a 
fundamentally degraded and subordinated view of women. 
 
This chapter traces the story of United States v. Virginia through the lenses of-
fered by these different views of equality.  It concludes that while the standard for evalu-
ating VMI’s exclusion of women became more rigorous at each stage, the case remained 
caught in a paradigm based on women’s right to have the opportunity to conform to exist-
ing institutions as long as it did not change them.  Yet just below the surface, United 
States v. Virginia raised unanswered questions about whether a state should be allowed to 
fund an educational program defined by hyper-masculine norms.  In proceeding as if pre-
serving the institution was both possible and desirable, the parties and the courts failed to 
confront the constitutional problems of a state-sponsored institution premised on the 
principles of male superiority.  As a result, the decision in the case opened VMI to 
women, but it did nothing to address the degrading gender norms that defined the school.  
In treating the problem of VMI as if it were solely about its single-sex admissions policy, 
the case also failed to distinguish between VMI and other single-sex schools. As a result, 
the decision failed to provide guidance to states and educators going forward about what 
forms of single-sex education, if any, are constitutional.  
 
The chapter analyzes these limitations, and suggests how a richer, more substan-
tive view of equality might have made a difference. 
 
I. The Virginia Military Institute 
 
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT  
 
 Founded in 1839, the Virginia Military Institute initially imposed a military-style 
training on raucous, undisciplined young men who had been gathered to guard an arsenal 
of armaments left over from the War of 1812.13  From its inception, the school accepted 
recalcitrant boys and used strict methods of military training to “draw out the man,” and 
instill discipline and character.14  Its first superintendent, Francis H. Smith, wrote that  
 
[m]any bad subjects were sent here to be reformed . . . . [W]e started with the idea 
that we would admit such bad subjects, and try and see what could be done with 
them.  The military organization of the institution had a tendency to fascinate such 
unruly spirits, who might be made valuable men by the military pride which promo-
tion to the military offices of the school held out to them.15  
 
VMI students studied the military sciences, as well as liberal arts, and engi-
neering.16  Although at one point called the “West Point of the South,” VMI was not in-
tended as a pipeline to professional military service; rather, its aim was the development 
of well-disciplined citizen-soldiers who could be leaders in their communities, ready to 
come to their country’s defense if necessary.17  In its early decades, it produced primarily 
school teachers and engineers;18 in recent years, 43% of its graduates accept military 
commissions,19 but only about 15% of its graduates make a full career of military ser-
vice.20  In addition to support from the state of Virginia,21 VMI receives substantial pri-
vate contributions from its alumni, making it the best endowed public undergraduate 
institution in the United States on a per-student basis.22 
                                                 
13  VMI historians describe the men as “an undesirable element in the social economy of aristocratic Lex-
ington” who were lacking in self-discipline and engaged in leisure-time antics that were both distasteful 
and threatening to the townspeople.  Jennings C. Wise, The Military History of the Virginia Military Insti-
tute from 1939 to 1865, at 31 (1915); Henry A. Wise, Drawing Out the Man: The VMI Story 11 (1978); 
Strum, supra note 3, at 9, 12 (2002). 
14  Henry A. Wise, supra note 13. 
15  Francis H. Smith, The Virginia Military Institute, Its Building and Rebuilding 242 (1912), quoted in 
Strum, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis in original). 
16  VMI was the first school in the South to teach engineering and industrial chemistry, and engineering 
became one of its core specialties. See Strum, supra note 3, at 12. 
17  Id. at 12–13. 
18  Id. at 14 (citing Col. William Couper, 1 One Hundred Years at V.M.I. 34–35 (1939)). [see 
memo][DONE] 
19  Jay Conley, Just Like the Guys, Roanoke Times, Aug. 12, 2007, at A1. 
20  United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
21  In representing the United States before the Supreme Court, Paul Bender stated that in the 1989–1990 
academic year, the state of Virginia contributed about $10 million to VMI, or about 35% of the school’s 
budget. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1–2, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-
2107). 
22 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 552. 
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VMI has been described as “deliberately anachronistic.”23  Although not techni-
cally a military academy, cadets dress in uniforms similar to those worn by the original 
cadets and they drill and march to and from class.24  Several times a day, as they enter the 
courtyard of the “post” from the barracks, they salute the larger-than-life statute of 
Stonewall Jackson, a Civil War hero and early VMI professor.25  Year after year, the ca-
dets commemorate Jackson and other VMI standard-bearers,  such as World War II Gen-
eral George C. Marshall, VMI Class of 1901.26  They also celebrate the Civil War Battle 
of New Market, at which a brave band of 241 young men from VMI (some as young as 
fifteen) marched eighty-four miles to battle and turned back Union forces.  Ten VMI ca-
dets died in the battle and forty-seven were wounded in the service of the Confederacy 
that day.  VMI marks their sacrifices with an annual re-enactment of the battle; a battle 
streamer hanging from VMI’s regimental colors; an enormous painting of the event in 
VMI’s Jackson Hall; and a tomb of six of the slain soldiers which lies beneath a statue, 
Virginia Bearing Her Dead, bearing the names of all the New Market cadets who fought 
in the battle.27 
 
Cadets live in Spartan conditions, three to five to a room, with no carpets, door 
locks, telephones, wall hangings, television sets, or air-conditioning.  With classes, mili-
tary drills, and conditioning exercises, days are tightly scheduled from 6:30 am through 
lights out at 11 p.m.28  A strict, student-enforced honor code commands that students not 
“lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate those who do.”  For even the most minor violation of this 
code, the single penalty is expulsion.29  
 
                                                 
23 Brodie, supra note 6, at xi. 
24  Strum, supra note 3, at 13. 
25  Further indication of the reverence in which Jackson is held is the mounting of the hide of Jackson’s 
horse, Little Sorrell, in the museum located at the lower level of the main building on the campus, Jackson 
Hall. See Brodie, supra note 6, at 6–8. 
26  Visitor Guide, Welcome to Virginia Military Institute (rev’d Feb. 2008). 
27  Strum, supra note 3, at 19–20.  The VMI Visitor Guide, “Welcome to Virginia Military Institute” (rev’d 
Feb. 2008) boasts that the 1864 battle was “the only time in American history that an entire college student 
body engaged in pitched battle as a single unit.”  The painting of the Battle of New Market is by Benjamin 
West Clinedinst, VMI Class of 1880; it is displayed prominently in the front of Jackson Memorial Hall. 
Brodie, supra note 6, at 3–6.  The statue of Virginia Mourning Her Dead is by Moses Ezekiel, also an 
alumnus.  The re-enactment ceremony takes take each fall; the rats’ first formal duty involves traveling to 
New Market to parade through the streets and, afterward, to gather at VMI’s Hall of Valor, a museum on 
the battlefield, where they learn about the events at New Market from upper-class re-enactors, and then, 
finally, stage their own charge across the battlefield.  Id. at 6–7. The deaths of the ten New Market soldiers 
are honored at the end of each year, with a review parade and a placing of wreaths on the graves of the six 
cadets who are buried at the foot of Virginia Mourning Her Dead.  Id. at 7. 
28 See Strum, supra note 3, at 43–45; United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421–22 (W.D. Va. 
1991); United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1992). 
29 Virginia, 976 F.2d at 894. 
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The small college in western Virginia is home to about 1,300 students.  For six 
consecutive years, U.S. News & World Report has ranked the school first, among the 
twenty-seven other public liberal arts colleges in the nation.30  While the school is ulti-
mately subject to control of the Virginia General Assembly, it is governed by a Board of 
Visitors, which is charged by state law with prescribing “the terms upon which cadets 
may be admitted, their number, the course of instruction, the nature of their service, and 
the duration thereof.”31  
 
VMI had always excluded women from admission as students.32  The exclusion of 
women, however, does not fully capture the maleness of the institution as it existed in 
1989.  The adversative system, which defined the essence of the institution,33 was delib-
erately and pervasively gendered.  Its design was to create leaders by giving them near-
impossible challenges, and then equating success in meeting those challenges to mascu-
linity.  Rat culture eschewed all things female, except as objects of derision and humilia-
tion.  Sexual references saturated the VMI “official” vocabulary.  Among the definitions 
every cadet must learn from the Rat Bible are to “bone,” or report someone for a viola-
tion; to “bust,” or reduce in rank; and “running a period,” or going twenty-eight days 
without a demerit.34   
 
The gendered nature of VMI method was especially apparent in the institution of 
the rat line.  The rat line tested the mettle of the entering rats by making them completely 
subservient to the largely unsupervised upper-class cadets, who ordered the rats to do 
push-ups and run laps to the point of total exhaustion, “strain,”35 run errands at all hours, 
and recite from memory portions of the Rat Bible.  To reinforce the machismo ethos, 
gendered obscenities and hostility toward women served as quasi-official motivational 
                                                 
30 Virginia Military Institute, VMI: VMI Again Ranked No. 1 Public Liberal Arts College In U.S., Aug. 18, 
2006, at http://new.vmi.edu/show.asp?durki=7803. 
31  Va. Code Ann. §§ 23-92 to 23-104 (2006).  VMI is supervised, like the other fifteen state-supported col-
leges and universities in Virginia, by the state’s Council of Higher Education.  Va. Code Ann. § 23-9.6:1(2) 
(2006).  The Council delegates to each institution the right to modify its mission and to establish admis-
sions criteria.  Id. 
32  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718 (1982), finding unconstitutional the exclusion of men from an all-female nursing school, VMI 
reexamined its male-only admissions policy.  After a nearly three-year study, a Mission Study Committee 
appointed by the VMI Board of Visitors counseled against changing VMI’s all-male policy.  See United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539 (1996); Strum, supra note 3, at 31–33. 
33  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548–49 (citing district court); Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1423 (“[M]ost important 
aspects of the VMI educational experience occur in the barracks.”). 
34  The Bullet, supra note 3, at 73, 76. 
35  To “strain” is to “rack in” one’s chin tightly into the neck, hold one’s arms stiffly, and push the chest far 
forward, while remaining erect and at rigid attention. The Rat Bible describes it as “a position you will 
practice most of the time as a Rat.”  Id. at 77. 
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techniques in the rat line.36  These coarse and demeaning characterizations of women as a 
whole were paired with chivalrous standards of behavior toward particular women—
“ladies”—that both defined men’s protective role and reinforced the ideology of 
women’s inequality.37 
 
Each rat was assigned a senior-class mentor or “dyke,” 38 but the dyke was some-
times the rat’s most enthusiastic tormenter.39 Not until the end of the rat line in an infa-
mous ritual known as “breakout” did the subordination subside.  Breakout reacted the 
brutality of the rat line.  It began with the rats crawling together in waves across twenty-
five to thirty yards of a cold, deep, mud quagmire and then up a steep, 40- to 50-degree 
slick incline.  As they tried to ascend the hill, upperclassmen kicked and pushed them 
back, slathering mud into their eyes, ears, and mouth.  Breakout finally ended, on cue, 
with upperclassmen extending a helpful hand or foot, literally and symbolically, to help 
the rats reach the top.40  
 
The problem with admitting women to this environment was as much that they 
might succeed at this manly challenge as that they would fail.  As one researcher put it, 
                                                 
36  Susan Faludi described this type of culture at The Citadel, the South Carolina counterpart of VMI whose 
exclusion of women was in litigation at the same time as the VMI lawsuit.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 44–48; Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, The New Yorker, Sept. 5, 1994, at 62; see also Valorie K. 
Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 Berkeley 
Women’s L.J. 68, 98–99 (2002) (describing the culture of hyper-masculinity at The Citadel).  One female 
cadet, looking back on her experience at VMI, described one experience which captured the VMI culture 
for her: “It really hit me once when I was watching TV with a group of guys . . . . It was a quiz show, and 
whenever a woman came on, she was instantly characterized as a bitch, a slut or a dog.”  Chris Kahn, VMI 
Graduates 1st Female Class: The 13 Cadets Survived Taunts and Formed Bonds, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, 
May 20, 2001, at A22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
37  Among the rules and expectations set forth in The Bullet, which rats must memorize, is The Code of a 
Gentleman, which provides, among other things, that a Gentleman does not “speak more than casually 
about his girl friend,” “go to a lady’s house if he is affected by alcohol,” “hail a lady from a club window,” 
discuss “the merits or demerits of a lady,” or “so much as lay a finger on a lady.”  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 
602–03 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  
38  “Dyke” is one of many terms at VMI that claim official meanings different from the sexualized meaning 
more commonly associated with them.  According to the Rat Bible, “dyke” means (a) “a combination of 
your mother, father, and older brother; your First Class pal; and confidant; (b) a uniform, e.g., class dyke, 
gym dyke, church dyke; (c) as a verb, to get dressed, especially for parade (‘dyke out’); (d) the insidious 
white cross-belts in which a hapless Rat gets hopelessly entangled while trying to ‘Dyke out’ without help.”  
The Bullet, supra note 3, at 74.  For other terms in the VMI lexicon, see supra text accompanying notes 36 
and infra text accompanying notes 225–226.  
39  See Calvin R. Trice, VMI is Taking Stock: Mentoring, Honor System Face Reviews, Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Nov. 7, 2001, at B3; Philip Walzer, One ‘Rat’ is Now a Recruiter of Female Cadets to Virginia 
Military Institute, Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA), Dec. 3, 2004. 
40  Strum, supra note 3, at 46–47; Brodie, supra note 6, at 312; Interview with Brig. Gen. Mike Bissell, in 
Staunton, VA (June 12, 2008). 
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“if women could perform well on [the rat line], how could it continue to function as evi-
dence of manhood?”41   
 
It was to this environment that the United States sought entry for women.  
 
II. The Legal Challenge 
 
A. United States and Virginia 
 
The 1989 challenge to VMI initiated by the United States Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) was not the first legal complaint about VMI’s exclusion of women.  A decade 
earlier in 1979, a female VMI professor, Margaret Mason Seider, filed suit after she was 
told her teaching contract would not be renewed.  In addition to her cause of action for 
wrongful discharge, she sought class-action status for females who might have wanted to 
be students at VMI.  Her claim was that “the total absence of female cadets creates an 
ambiance and an atmosphere at VMI which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a fe-
male professor . . . to participate fully in the life of VMI and pervades all aspects of the 
institute.”42  Seider claimed that while at VMI, she was subject to harassment by cadets, 
including obscene phone calls, open disrespect by cadets to her authority, and a vicious 
cartoon directed against her in the cadet newspaper.  Within a month, the suit settled by 
confidential agreement.43  
 
At the time of the anonymous 1989 complaint, VMI and South Carolina’s The 
Citadel were the only state-supported, all-male colleges in the country.44  Subsequent litiga-
tion filed in 1993 against The Citadel by Shannon Faulkner led to an injunction by the 
United States  Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, requiring The Citadel to admit 
Faulkner to day classes while that lawsuit was pending.45  Faulkner dropped out of The 
Citadel less than a week after she entered, “overcome by stress and terror as the only 
woman alone in the barracks with 1800 male cadets, most of whom hated her guts.”46  The 
district court later held that the denial of Faulkner’s admission violated her right to substan-
                                                 
41  Strum, supra note 3, at 109. 
42  Jen McCaffery & Matt Chittum, An Early Skirmish Over Admissions, Roanoke Times, Aug. 1, 2004, at 
B1. 
43  Id. 
44  Strum, supra note 3, at 131. 
45  Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction to Faulkner and 
ordering her admitted to day classes). 
46  Vojdik, Gender Outlaws, supra note 36, at 71.  Poor physical conditioning was also a factor.  Citadel’s 
First Female Case Tells of the Stress of Her Court Fight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1995, § 1, at 36 (Faulkner 
was considerably overweight); see Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 Harv. Women’s L.J. 39, 76–77 
(1999) (faulting Faulkner’s attorneys for not ensuring that she was more prepared to enter The Citadel, in-
cluding being in good physical shape).  Other women picked up the litigation after Faulkner left The Cita-
del.  See Mellette v. Jones, 136 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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tially equal educational opportunities and ordered a remedial plan for the admission of 
other women to be submitted.47  The matter was not finally resolved until the 1996 decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in the VMI case, at which point The Citadel immedi-
ately began admitting women.48  
 
As the VMI case began to unfold, neither the United States nor Virginia appeared 
to be fully committed to the litigation.  DOJ initiated this matter without consulting with 
then-President George H.W. Bush.49  The lead lawyer, Judith Keith of the Civil Rights 
Division,50 was personally invested in the case, but the division was understaffed51 and 
the lawyering team lacked expertise.52  The Bush administration tied the department’s 
hands on certain litigation claims, barring attorneys, for example, from conceding that 
anything other than dorm rooms and bathrooms would have to change with women’s ad-
mission.53  In the appeals phase, DOJ was ordered not to communicate with the amici cu-
riae or interested civil rights groups about the appeals strategy.54 
 
As for Virginia, despite the enthusiasm of VMI alumni for remaining all-male, 
many state officials and various state constituencies favored the admission of women to 
the school.  When first contacted by the DOJ in 1989, Governor Gerald L. Baliles tried to 
persuade the VMI Board of Visitors to admit women.55  In response, and under fierce 
pressure by many influential alumni and with the legal advice of former United States 
Attorney General Griffin Bell, the VMI Board of Visitors affirmed its single-sex admis-
sions policy.56  The lieutenant governor of the state and Democratic nominee for gover-
nor in 1989, L. Douglas Wilder, vacillated over the VMI issue, and the state attorney 
                                                 
47  Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994). 
48  Strum, supra note 3, at 298.  
49  Id. at 90. 
50  Id. at 35. 
51  Id. at 105–06. 
52  Id. at 185-86. 
53  Id. at 192.  The discomfort of DOJ attorneys with this restriction was sometimes quite apparent.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 161–162. 
54  Id. at 190. 
55  In the letter, Governor Baliles stated that Virginia law did not preclude the admission of women to VMI 
and that, furthermore, the “historic fact that VMI has never admitted a woman student does not justify the 
continuance of that policy.”  Letter from Gerald L. Baliles, Governor, Virginia, to Joseph M. Spivey, III, 
President of the VMI Board of Visitors (Apr. 18, 1990) (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Vir-
ginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.).  
56  Bell advised the Board that the admissions policy was “defensible” and that there was a “good chance” 
that VMI’s all-male admissions policy would be upheld by the United States Supreme Court.  Letter from 
Joseph M. Spivey, III, to the Honorable Gerald L. Baliles (Apr. 19, 1989) (on file with VMI Archives, Pre-
ston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.).  
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general, Mary Sue Terry, put off giving an opinion.57  After Wilder became governor, the 
district court forced him to take a stand, and he publicly came out in favor of admitting 
women to VMI.58  At that point Terry withdrew from the case,59 with assurances to the 
court that VMI’s board and alumni would be represented by private counsel.  That coun-
sel was the firm of McGuire, Woods, Battle and Boothe, led by Robert H. Patterson, Jr., a 
loyal member of the VMI Class of 1949.60  
 
Of all the leaders in the state executive branch during this period, only Republican 
George Allen, when he became governor in 1994, enthusiastically supported VMI’s ex-
clusion of women.61  The legislature also stood behind VMI, reflecting the strong influ-
ence of VMI alumni in the state, but some legislators made vigorous efforts to change the 
                                                 
57 Strum, supra note 3, at 90–91. 
58  Id. at 103; see also United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991) (reporting that 
the governor told the court that he did not oppose entry of summary judgment against him).  The lack of 
support by the Governor confused that matter when the case reached the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
“To the extent that the Governor’s view represents state policy,” the appellate panel wrote, “VMI’s single-
sex admissions policy violates state policy.”  United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).  
In the course of the second trial proceedings in 1994, Governor Wilder publicly supported the VWIL plan, 
representing to the court that he was “satisfied that [the] plan is educationally sound and will remedy all 
current discrimination.”  Strum, supra note 3, at 208. 
59 Virginia, 976 F.2d at 894; Strum, supra note 3, at 196. Terry stated that she could not defend a position 
opposite to that of the Governor and that, in any case, the Governor was correct in interpreting state policy 
to preclude the exclusion of women. See also Chronology 1989–1993, The United States Department of 
Justice vs. The Commonwealth of Virginia and Virginia Military Institute (on file with VMI Archives, Pre-
ston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.) (stating that on November 27, 1990, Attorney 
General Terry asked Judge Kiser to release her from the case “since she feels she cannot defend a position 
opposite to that of the governor”). Four years later Terry would be the leading Democratic candidate for 
governor and take the position that women should be admitted to VMI, while the three Republican candi-
dates took the opposite position.  Strum, supra note 3, at 198–99.  Among other state officials who opposed 
VMI’s exclusion of women was Gordon Davies, Executive Director of the Council of Higher Education, 
which coordinated Virginia’s fifteen public institutions of higher learning.  Davies was eventually dropped 
as a defendant in the lawsuit.  Id. at 89, 99. [see memo] 
60  Strum, supra note 3, at 94, 105; Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.  Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated that this representation was taken on a pro bono basis, see 976 F.2d at 894; see also 
Chronology, supra note 59.  However, VMI was reported to have spent at least $14 million in legal and 
other fees to defend the lawsuit, $6 million to the Patterson’s firm alone.  Strum, supra note 3, at 298; see 
also David Reed, VMI’s Fight Costs Over $14 Million: Alumni Footing Legal Bills, Roanoke Times, Jan. 
19, 1998, at A1 (reporting that VMI spent $14 million to defend lawsuit, not counting a $6.9 million pledge 
to endow the VWIL program at Mary Baldwin College).  [see memo] 
61  See Allison Black, Allen Supports VMI Setting Up Separate Schools for Women, The Virginian-Pilot 
(Norfolk, VA), Jan. 27, 1994, at D4.  Upon hearing of VMI’s victory in the second district court trial, Allen 
stated in his commencement address to VMI that he would “stand up to the arrogant, meddling federal bu-
reaucrats whenever Virginia’s right and prerogative are threatened,” and suggested that the government had 
tried to destroy VMI because it hated the things VMI stood for, including “the traditional American values 
and virtues of moral character, personal discipline, self-reliance and an unabashed and unashamed love of 
home, state and country, and the willingness to fight to defend them.”  Donald P. Baer, Allen Assails Efforts 
to End VMI’s All-Male Status, Wash. Post, May 22, 1994, at B4. 
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all-male admissions policy.62  A majority of the Virginia public at the start of the litiga-
tion thought that VMI should admit women63 and, according to an informal poll, 62% of 
the VMI faculty favored coeducation.64 
 
B. The District Court Rationalizes the Exclusion of Women 
 
On January 30, 1990, the Department of Justice made a formal request to Vir-
ginia’s Governor Wilder and to VMI Board of Visitors President Joseph M. Spivey, III, 
for a commitment to abandon VMI’s single-sex admissions policy.  VMI knew the re-
quest was coming, and was ready and waiting.  Although the response was not due until 
February 20, by February 5, VMI and the VMI Foundation had filed two pre-emptive 
lawsuits in the local federal district court in the Western District of Virginia (Roanoke). 
The sole judge in the district was Judge Jackson L. Kiser who, on a number of previous 
occasions, had failed to properly apply sex discrimination laws, even after being reversed 
on appeal.65  One suit was filed on behalf of VMI by state attorney general Terry.  The 
other was filed on behalf of the VMI Foundation by Griffin Bell and Robert Patterson.  
Both suits sought declarative and injunctive relief “to prevent federal encroachment seek-
ing to enforce unnecessary conformity in the state-supported system of higher education 
in Virginia” and a declaration that VMI’s admissions policy was constitutional.66  Having 
missed its chance to file the case first in a more friendly forum, DOJ then filed its own 
suit in Roanoke, requesting a permanent injunction prohibiting VMI from discrimination 
                                                 
62  Strum, supra note 3, at 88–92, 95–96, 104–05. 
63  A poll of 616 Virginians released in June 1989 showed that Virginians favored the admission of women 
to VMI by a margin of 57% to 34%.  The poll’s objectivity was disputed, and in February 1990 a second 
poll was released showing a narrower gap (a ratio of 5-4) in favor of women’s admission.  See A Challenge 
to VMI’s Admissions Policy, Chronological Events, VMI Alumni Rev., Spring 1990, at 2l; Strum, supra 
note 3, at 90. 
64  Brodie, supra note 6, at 19. 
65  One such case involved an action by the United States against a county sheriff for refusing to hire 
women.  Judge Kiser had first ruled that deputy sheriff positions were not covered by Title VII because 
they fell within the “personal staff” exemption.  The Fourth Circuit overruled him on this point but, on re-
mand, again held that the positions at issue were exempted as personal staff positions.  He also held that 
maleness was a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for one of the positions (corrections offi-
cer).  Judge Kiser was overruled again by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on the second remand, 
Judge Kiser found that the U.S. had not presented sufficient evidence of discrimination.  The Fourth Circuit 
reversed Judge Kiser a third time, holding clearly erroneous his improper ignoring of admissions by the 
sheriff, as well as other mistakes obscuring the opportunities for hiring women of which the sheriff failed to 
take advantage.  The facts and case history is summarized in the last Fourth Circuit opinion, United States 
v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1989). 
66  Complaint at 1, VMI v. Thornburgh, No. 90-083 (W.D. Va. Filed Feb. 5, 1990) (Complaint at 1, VMI 
Foundation v. United States, No. 90-084 (W.D. Va. Filed Feb. 5, 1990). 
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on the basis of gender.67  Later that year, Judge Kiser consolidated the different actions 
into a single case.68  
 
At trial in the district court, testimony from nineteen witnesses took six days. 
The government’s theory of the case tracked a familiar legal principle: women are 
equal to men, and thus entitled to all the same benefits and opportunities.  Although the 
government conceded that few women were likely to be interested in attending the 
state-supported school, it insisted that VMI could not exclude women so long as any 
woman was able to satisfy VMI’s requirements.69  
 
In contrast to the government’s controlled logic and the absence of tangible 
beneficiaries, VMI’s presentation was impassioned and emphasized the high, human 
stakes—the uniqueness of the school, its success in training leaders in Virginia, and the 
honorable way of life it represented.  VMI advocates argued that it would be foolish to 
undermine that unique asset—indeed, jeopardize all single-sex schools—for some ab-
stract principle that ignored differences between men and women.  The school also 
played a strong states’ rights card, arguing that the federal government’s Goliath should 
not be allowed to force its own particular theory of education upon the sovereign state 
of Virginia.70 
 
Some years later, Judge Kiser remembered that before he got into the case, he 
thought the government “had a slam-dunk position.”71  By the time he had heard the ex-
tensive evidence of the benefits of single-sex education, differences in the way men and 
women learn, and the negative experience of gender integration at West Point and the 
other service academies,72 however, he had changed his mind.  His 1991 decision was a 
complete victory for VMI.  Comparing the case to the “life-and-death” confrontation be-
tween the United States and the Virginia Military Institute at New Market, Virginia in 
1864,73 he invoked the traditional deference owed to states in educational decisionmak-
ing—a deference that appeared somewhat surreal given the lack of support for VMI’s all-
male policy by two state governors, the attorney general, the executive director of the 
                                                 
67  United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R). 
68  Virginia, No. 90-126 (W.D. Va. Nov. 27, 1990) (order). 
69  Strum, supra note 3, at 140. 
70 See, e.g., Strum, supra note 3, at 142–43. 
71 Interview with Jackson L. Kiser, District Judge, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, 
in Danville, Va. (July 14, 2008). 
72 For a detailed account of the testimony on a wide range of issues, see Strum, supra note 3, at 139–72. 
73 Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408. For a description of the meaning of that battle to VMI, see supra text 
accompanying note 33. 
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Council of Higher Education, and a majority of the VMI faculty and non-VMI population 
of the state.74 
 
The core of Judge Kiser’s analysis was an account of the benefits of single-sex edu-
cation.  Citing studies showing that graduates of both male and female single-sex colleges 
do better than graduates of coeducational colleges, Judge Kiser accepted VMI’s argument 
that single-sex education offers substantial advantages over coeducational institutions75 and 
that a ruling against VMI would threaten all single-sex educational institutions.   In defin-
ing the battle broadly, the court avoided analysis of any factors particular to VMI that 
might have been especially problematic.  The presumed threat to single-sex education also 
made the case increasingly a politically potent symbol and the source of substantial future 
amicus support.76  
 
The advantages of single-sex education did not explain why Virginia gave only 
men, and not women, a single-sex option.  Virginia attempted to justify this gap by dem-
onstrating that through the fifteen schools it supported throughout the state, it provided a 
diverse set of educational opportunities for its residents, and that VMI was an important 
part of that diversity.  Each of the schools had its own mission and standards, and all of 
them but VMI were open to women.  In particular, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University (Virginia Tech) offered strong engineering programs and a military 
training program.77 
 
Judge Kiser agreed.  Virginia’s stated interest in educational diversity was legiti-
mate, and excluding women from VMI was necessary to accomplishing that diversity. 
“The presence of women,” according to Judge Kiser, “would tend to distract male stu-
dents from their studies” and “increase pressures relating to dating, which would tend to 
impair the esprit de corps” and the egalitarian atmosphere so critical to the VMI experi-
ence.78  Women cadets would require allowances for privacy and other accommodations 
that would dilute the strength of VMI’s adversative teaching method.79  The presence of 
                                                 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 55–64.  
75 The primary source was Alexander W. Astin, Four Critical Years: Effects of College on Beliefs, Atti-
tudes, and Knowledge (1977); see Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412, 1435 (Findings VII. B. 10, 11) (“Students 
of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty frequently, show larger increases in 
intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of college experience . . . .”).  Judge 
Kiser failed to note that support for this claim was research based on 1961 to 1974 data, when single-sex 
schools were among the most elite institutions in the country, and thus selected disproportionately by col-
lege applicants with the strongest credentials.  At the second trial Astin was recruited by DOJ to dispute the 
conclusions that the court had drawn from his research.  At that point, the district court decided not to give 
his testimony any weight. See infra note 108. 
76  See Strum, supra note 3, at 198, 235, 261–63. 
77  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411–12, 1418–19; Strum, supra note 3, at 150.  But see infra note 89. 
78  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412. 
79  Id. 
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women would also require VMI to rethink its tough physical fitness requirements, since 
few women would be able to meet the existing ones.80  Beyond these concrete dilutions 
of standards, Judge Kiser concluded that women, by their very presence, would funda-
mentally alter an intangible element in the “VMI experience.”  It would be impossible for 
even the rare female who “could physically and psychologically undergo the rigors of the 
life of a male cadet” to participate in this experience; “her introduction into the process 
would change it,” making “the very experience she sought . . . no longer . . . available.”81  
In other words, VMI’s maleness defined the experience, which women would destroy, as 
evidenced by the many concessions to women made at West Point, the Air Force Acad-
emy, and the other federal service academies after Congress required them to admit 
women.82  
 
The district court opinion acknowledged that the deference to Virginia required in 
this case “is not absolute,”83 and it articulated the intermediate standard of review for sex-
based classifications established in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,84 requir-
ing that there be “a substantial relationship between the single-sex admission policy and 
achievement of the Commonwealth’s objective of educational diversity.”85  Judge Kiser’s 
opinion,  however, bore little evidence of that heightened standard.86  It did not surface 
                                                 
80  Id. at 1413.  The minimum physical fitness requirement at VMI was sixty sit-ups and five pull-ups in 
two minutes, and a one-and-one-half-mile run in twelve minutes.  Strum, supra note 3, at 206.  The court 
here disregards the fact that about half of VMI’s new cadets fail the minimum fitness test, some of whom 
eventually graduate without having passed the test.  Brief for the Petitioner at 29, United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107); Strum, supra note 3, at 150. 
81  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1414. 
82  Congressional action occurred in 1975 before the federal courts had resolved a lawsuit filed by four 
members of Congress who objected to being required to discriminate on the basis of sex in making nomina-
tions for the service academies.  For a brief account, see Strum, supra note 3, at 116–23.  For more detail, 
see Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution (1993).  For the trial court’s compari-
sons between VMI and the service academies, see Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1432, 1439; Strum, supra note 
3 at 143, 155–59, 169, 171. 
83  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1409. 
84  458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
85  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730).  At one point Judge Kiser used the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification language” set forth in several Supreme Court cases.  See infra note 
134.  He referenced that language, however, to the strength of the evidence supporting VMI’s contention 
that some students benefit from attending a single-sex college, rather than to the strength of the state’s justi-
fication for excluding women from VMI.  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411. 
86  Oddly, the court approvingly cited two cases decided before the Supreme Court began to raise the con-
stitutional standard in sex discrimination cases.  One case, Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 
1970) (three-judge panel), aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), cited at Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1409, 
upheld a challenge to an all-female school in South Carolina, Winthrop College.  The other decision upheld 
a consent decree in which the court “encouraged a settlement that required the [University of Virginia] to 
admit women,” but refused to order the University to admit women because of its reluctance to “‘interfere 
with the internal operation of any Virginia college or university,’” as well as concerns about the impact on 
VMI.  Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1409–10 (citing Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. 
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any of the stereotypes upon which VMI based the exclusion of women.  It did not ques-
tion the plausibility of the diversity rationale offered by Virginia.  It did not face the fact 
that the only single-sex school remaining in Virginia’s “diverse” system existed for men.  
Its eye was on purportedly undeniable differences between men and women and on the 
unique and creative way VMI took account of those differences.  “VMI truly marches to 
the beat of a different drummer, and I will permit it to continue to do so.”87 
 
The march would not end there. 
 
C. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Accepts VMI’s Legitimate Purpose, but 
Finds that Providing a Single-Sex Education Only to Men Is Unfair to Women 
 
Both sides proceeded to the appellate stage faced with a difficult balancing act.  
The federal government would be satisfied only if VMI admitted women and thus con-
tinued to claim that women would not change anything about the school.  Yet its insis-
tence that women were no different from men seemed implausible, even laughable, given 
VMI’s pedagogical goal of developing men who were “more macho than thou.”88  
 
VMI was caught in its own Catch-22.  It emphasized the uniqueness of its adver-
sative method in order to establish both its contribution to the “diverse” set of public edu-
cational opportunities in Virginia and the fact that women were unsuited to it and would 
undermine it.  But the more it stressed VMI’s uniqueness, the clearer it became that 
women were missing out on something.89  Similarly, as the state spelled out the features 
of VMI that established the tight fit between the school’s mission and the exclusion of 
women, the relationship between VMI and the particular brand of maleness on which it 
relied became clearer, and the State implicated itself more deeply in a system that pro-
moted male superiority.  While the United States did not explicitly challenge VMI on this 
ground, surely the school was sensitive to the risks of overplaying its hand. 
 
The Fourth Circuit panel accepted much of the district court’s analysis of the case. 
It agreed that single-sex education offered substantial benefits over coeducation; that 
VMI’s adversative method had particular, unique advantages to the men it served; and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge panel) (“One of Virginia’s educational institutions is military 
in character.  Are women to be admitted on an equal basis, and, if so, are they to wear uniforms and be 
taught to bear arms?”)).  The University of Virginia began admitting women in 1972.  United States v. Vir-
ginia, 518 U.S. 515, 538 (1996). 
87  766 F. Supp. at 1415. 
88  This phrase was used by an expert for VMI describing women who would be able to endure the adversa-
tive method. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 80, at 38; Jane Maslow Cohen, Equality for Girls and 
Other Women: The Built Architecture of the Purposive Life, 9 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 103, 113 n.18, 45, 
& 24 (1998). 
89  VMI’s claim of uniqueness also prevented Virginia from arguing coherently that women could receive 
the same benefits at other schools in the state.  At one point in the litigation, VMI suggested that an oppor-
tunity similar to that at VMI was available to women at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
but, as the Fourth Circuit noted in its later opinion, it did not press the point.  See United States v. Virginia, 
976 F.2d 890, 898 n.8 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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that the presence of women at VMI would require changes to the core methodology of 
the school and thus undermine its contribution to Virginia’s “diverse” set of higher edu-
cation opportunities.  On these grounds, it agreed that Virginia had a legitimate purpose 
in maintaining VMI as an all-male school.90  
 
At the same time, the panel agreed with the Justice Department that these benefits 
could not be extended exclusively to men.  “A policy of diversity which aims to provide 
an array of educational opportunities, including single-gender institutions, must do more 
than favor one gender,”91 Judge Niemeyer wrote for the three-judge panel.  The bottom 
line was not what VMI had hoped for: VMI would have to admit women, lose its state 
funding, or establish a parallel program for women.92  
 
It was clear that, as between these options, Judge Niemeyer expected Virginia to 
pursue parallel programs.  He also understood that, even with an option for women, the ex-
clusion of women from VMI might still be considered discrimination based on sex.  He 
anticipated this objection by characterizing the potential continued exclusion of women as a 
gender-neutral criterion based on homogeneity, rather than on maleness per se.  “It is not 
the maleness, as distinguished from femaleness, that provides justification for the pro-
gram,” he wrote. “It is the homogeneity of gender in the process, regardless of which sex is 
considered, that has been shown to be related to the essence of the education and training at 
VMI.”93  With parallel programs, VMI would not necessarily have to admit women. 
 
Not pleased with the alternatives offered by the appellate court, Virginia sought a 
rehearing, both by the three-judge court and by the full court, en banc.  Its appeal requests 
were denied,94 but the court issued a stay of the ruling, pending appeal of the case to the 
Supreme Court.  For this appeal, VMI persuaded several women’s colleges to participate 
as amici curiae.  These amici argued that a ruling against VMI would not only throw sin-
gle-sex colleges into doubt, but battered women’s shelters and single-sex prisons as 
well.95  The Supreme Court, however, was not ready to hear the case and denied certio-
rari.96  The parties would need to proceed in light of the Fourth Circuit opinion. 
 
D. The Second Trial, and Appeal, Approving Separate, Parallel Programs 
                                                 
90  Virginia, 976 F.2d at 897–98. 
91  Id. at 899. 
92  Id. at 900. 
93  Id. at 897. 
94  Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (No. 91-1690) (petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc filed 
Nov. 19, 1992). 
95  Strum, supra note 3, at 198. 
96  Virginia Military Institute v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993) (with Justice Scalia stating that the is-
sue should receive the attention of the Court, but that “we generally await final judgment in the lower 
courts before exercising our certiorari judgment”). 
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The VMI alumni community was shaken by the Fourth Circuit decision and con-
sidered how to respond to it.  One possibility was to give up state funding and remain all-
male, which many supporters favored.  While this possibility remained under considera-
tion, in June 1993, the VMI Board of Visitors told its lawyers to begin drawing up a pro-
posal for a substitute program for women, the existence of which also would allow VMI 
to stay all-male.97  
 
As it happened, only thirty-five miles away a 2,000-student, all-female private 
school, Mary Baldwin College, had been thinking of developing a leadership program.  It 
would become an issue at the next trial just when the school first began this thinking, and 
when the goal of developing “citizen soldier” became part of the concept.  Whether Mary 
Balwin College’s interest in a leadership program was fortuitous or opportunistic, by 
September 1993, Mary Baldwin had approved the development of a women’s leadership 
program with a military emphasis—Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership Institute 
(“VWIL”)—and VMI had committed to it $6.5 million in endowment and operating 
funds.  Governor Wilder pledged an additional $6.9 million in state funds for start-up 
costs.98  
 
Over the next year, a task force from Mary Baldwin made up of faculty, administra-
tors, and a student developed the details of the VWIL proposal.  Their charge was to de-
velop the most effective model of leadership training for producing “citizen-soldiers who 
are educated and honorable women, prepared for the varied work of civil life, qualified to 
serve in the armed forces, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions of atti-
tudes of leadership, and possessing a high sense of public service.”99  
 
By February 1994, when the constitutionality of the proposed parallel, single-sex 
programs came before the district court, the VWIL plan provided for a detailed academic 
program with required courses in the liberal arts, leadership, physical education, and health. 
The plan provided that every student  have a leadership externship, organize a community 
service project or campus activity, and participate in a one-week wilderness program run 
by students and a twice-a-week “Cooperative Confidence Building” program involving ob-
stacle courses, rappelling, and a ropes course.  The proposal also required four years of 
ROTC training, for which students would be bussed to VMI.  VWIL students would be-
come part of a Virginia Corps of Cadets, along with students from VMI and the coed Vir-
ginia Tech corps.  Freshmen would participate in a one-week “Cadre week orientation” in 
the summer.  Upper-class students would provide mentoring, enforce behavior regulations, 
organize leadership speakers, and exercise leadership responsibilities.100  
                                                 
97 Strum, supra note 3, at 199.  
98  Id. at 201–02, 208; United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 491–92 (W.D. Va. 1994). 
99  Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 494. 
100  Id. at 494-98.  The Cadre is composed of third class (junior) corporals and first class (senior) executive 
officers who are in charge of training the rats.  Brodie, supra note 6, at 226. 
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The goal was never to replicate the VMI program at Mary Baldwin College, and 
those who developed the proposal understood that the differences between the VWIL 
proposal and VMI were substantial.  The purpose of VWIL was to develop female citizen 
soldiers, not to duplicate the adversative method of VMI.  Its method was “cooperative” 
and designed to reinforce self-esteem, rather than to tear down egos and the cadet’s sense 
of individuality.101  VWIL’s focus was on “building up self confidence through mastery 
of physical, intellectual, and experiential challenges.”102  VWIL students would live with 
other VWIL students for at least one year, but the living accommodations would not be as 
sparse as VMI’s.  Moreover, doors to the rooms would have locks, and showers and tubs 
would have doors or curtains.  VWIL women would wear uniforms only on the days in 
which they were participating in ROTC or the Virginia Corps of Cadets.  They would not 
be subject to an unrelenting military regime, nor would VWIL women be issued arms. 
Physical fitness requirements, though judged by the district court to be “comparable in 
rigor and challenge,” would be less demanding than VMI’s.103  
 
While some differences between VWIL and VMI were based on pedagogical phi-
losophy, others were a consequence of resource constraints and the expected lack of a 
critical mass of women interested in certain aspects of VMI’s program.  For example, the 
VWIL curriculum would have no courses in engineering or advanced math or physics; 
VWIL students wanting these courses would have to attend Washington University in St. 
Louis, with whom Mary Baldwin had a relationship.104  Mary Baldwin would have fewer 
NCAA-level sports, and the athletic facilities would be substantially inferior to those of 
VMI.  Proportionally fewer of Mary Baldwin’s faculty had Ph.D.’s, and faculty salaries 
were in the lowest 20% in the country, whereas VMI’s were in the top 8%.  The average 
SAT score of students at Mary Baldwin was 100 points lower than that at VMI.105  
 
Judge Kiser was not troubled by the differences between the programs.  He 
pointed out that the Fourth Circuit had specified not an “equal” school for women,” but 
rather a “parallel institution[s] or parallel program[s].”  Identical programs could not have 
been intended by the appellate court, Judge Kiser reasoned, since no one could expect a 
new program to “supply those intangible qualities of history, reputation, tradition, and 
prestige that VMI has amassed over the years.”  It was “unrealistic to think that the 
                                                 
101  Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476. 
102  Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College (“VWIL Plan”) 2 (Sept. 1994) (on 
file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.); see also Strum, supra 
note 3, at 205. [see memo] 
103  Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 496–98, 502 (emphasis added); Strum, supra note 3, at 205–06.  Instead of 
sixty sit-ups and five pull-ups in two minutes, and a one-and-one-half mile run in twelve minutes, VWIL 
would require twenty-eight push-ups in two minutes, sixty full-body sit-ups in two minutes, a flexed arm 
hang of at least fifteen seconds, and a one-and-one-half mile run in just under fourteen minutes and thirty 
seconds.  Strum, supra note 3 at 206.  
104  Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 494. 
105  Id. at 501. 
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Fourth Circuit was requiring an exercise in futility.”106  Moreover, the appellate court had 
noted in The Citadel case that any parallel program “must take into account the nature of 
the difference on which the separation [of the sexes] is based, the relevant benefits to the 
needs of each gender, the demand (both in terms of quality and quantity), and any other 
relevant factor.”107  
 
The district court believed that these signals from the appellate court left ample 
room to take into account the different needs and learning patterns of women about which 
many witnesses testified.108  The differences, Judge Kiser concluded, made the VMI 
model unsuitable for women; the same model “would not produce the same outcomes for 
the VWIL population as it does for the VMI population.”109  Moreover, the rationale for 
Virginia’s separate colleges and universities compelled different educational models: 
“The very concept of diversity precludes the Commonwealth from offering an identical 
curriculum at each of its colleges.”110  The uniqueness of VWIL, like the uniqueness of 
VMI, was a strength, not a liability.111  Finally, although VMI’s curricular offerings, fa-
cilities, and faculty were superior to those of Mary Baldwin’s,112 the tuition of VWIL and 
VMI students would be the same, as would the per-student support received directly from 
the state.113  The bottom line was that VWIL would “attain an outcome for women that is 
comparable to that received by young men upon graduation from VMI.”114  “[I]f VMI 
                                                 
106  Id. at 475. 
107  Id. at 476 (citing Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
108  There were significant disputes at the trial and thereafter about the expertise of the experts, which in-
cluded a woman’s studies historian, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, who testified that the lack of confidence of 
college women would make the VMI adversative method counter-productive for them, and sociologist 
David Riesman, who gave testimony about the way women learn.  Strum, supra note 3, at 210–19, 223.  
There was also disagreement about whose experts belonged to whom.  For example, VMI claimed that 
Carol Gilligan’s work supported its position, but she pointed out at the appellate level that the experts upon 
whom Judge Kiser had relied were not experts and that the scientific evidence did not show that men bene-
fited from single-sex education.  Id. at 153, 217, 258.  Alexander Astin’s scholarship had been relied upon 
in the first trial by Judge Kiser for the benefits of single-sex education, but in the second trial Astin was a 
witness for DOJ, disputing the inappropriateness of a VMI education for women.  Id. at 225.  At that point, 
Judge Kiser dismissed his testimony because, among other things, his opposition to VMI’s all-male admis-
sions policy impaired his objectivity.  See Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 479.  He apparently found Dr. Fox-
Genovese’s objectivity unimpaired by the fact that she favored VMI remaining an all-male school.  Id. at 
480–81; Strum, supra note 3, at 229. 
109  Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 477–78. 
110  Id. at 477. 
111  Id. at 477–81. 
112  The district court found, for example, that VMI’s $131 million endowment made it the largest on a per 
student basis than any other undergraduate institution, as compared to Mary Baldwin’s $19 million en-
dowment.  Id. at 503. 
113  Id. at 483 & n.19. 
114  Id. at 473 (summarizing Virginia’s position).  
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marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and 
when the march is over, both will have arrived at the same destination.”115  On these 
grounds, the “remedial” plan was approved.116  
 
By a 2-to-1 vote, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision.  The majority reiterated its prior analysis that single-sex educa-
tion is a legitimate and important governmental objective, and that VMI’s adversative 
method would not work if women were present.  However, while the panel had earlier 
indicated that admitting women would be one available option, two of the three judges 
now suggested that gender integration would be irresponsible because of the hostile envi-
ronment a coeducation environment would create for women.117 “If we were to place men 
and women into the adversative relationship inherent in the VMI program,” Judge Nie-
meyer wrote for the panel majority, “we would destroy . . . any sense of decency that still 
permeates the relationship between the sexes.”118  
 
Judge Phillips dissented, previewing the analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court 
would eventually bring to the case.  In his view, diversity was not the state’s actual pur-
pose in establishing either VMI or the VWIL program; diversity was merely a rationali-
zation designed to allow VMI to continue to exclude women.119  Moreover, even if 
diversity was the legitimate state objective, no parallel program could satisfy the mid-
level scrutiny required by the U.S. Constitution unless the programs were “substantially 
equal in all of the relevant criteria, tangible and intangible, by which educational institu-
tions are evaluated.”120 To Judge Phillips, the differences in prestige, tradition, and 
alumni influence alone, even without the significant differences in curriculum, funding, 
facilities, faculty, and library, meant that the state was not offering equal programs to 
men and women.121  
 
                                                 
115  Id. at 484. 
116  Id. at 484. 
117  United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the adversative method that is 
central to a VMI education “has never been tolerated in a sexually heterogeneous environment”); see also 
George H. Roberts, Jr., Case Set for Oral Argument September 28, 1994: The Citadel Stays All Male, But 
Must Present Parallel Program Option, VMI Alumni Rev., Summer/Fall 1994, at 18, 19 (summarizing 
Virginia’s argument in the case that “neither VMI nor the cadets could articulate principles that could pre-
vent the accusations of sexual harassment or the conditions that might give rise to those complaints”). [see 
memo] 
118  Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1239. 
119  Id. at 1247 (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
120  Id. at 1249 (emphasis in original). 
121 Id. at 1250 (“[T]he contrast between the two on all the relevant tangible and intangible criteria is so pal-
pable as not to require detailed recitation.”). 
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Judge Phillips asked for a rehearing en banc, which failed to get the necessary 
votes.122  Both parties then sought higher review.  
 
E. The United States Supreme Court: Assimilation Without Change 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,123 and in this final stretch, both sides 
raised the ante.  As cross-petitioners, Virginia returned to its original position that VMI’s 
all-male admissions policy was justified and constitutional, with or without VWIL.124 
Numerous amici curiae filed briefs with the Court to underscore the importance of the 
issue they claimed the case raised: the survival of single-sex education.125  
 
For its part, the United States, for the first time in any litigation, argued that “strict 
scrutiny” was the appropriate standard for reviewing sex-based classifications.126  This 
argument was clearly an invitation to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who on many occa-
sions as a women’s rights advocate had promoted this position before the Court.127  A 
number of the amici curiae briefs supported the strict scrutiny argument.128  
                                                 
122  Although six judges had voted to rehear the case en banc and four had voted against rehearing, three 
judges had recused themselves, United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995); rehearing en banc 
under Fourth Circuit rules permits rehearing en banc only with a majority of the Circuit’s judges without 
regard to recusals.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 n.4 (1996).  Judge Diana Gribbon Motz 
wrote a stinging dissent from the denial of rehearing, on behalf of herself and three other judges.  Virginia, 
52 F.3d 90. 
123  Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, cert. granted, 516 U.S. 910 (1995). 
124  Brief for the Cross-Petitioners at 36–47, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 
94-2107). As respondent, Virginia focused its defense of the parallel programs offered by VMI and VWIL. 
Brief for the Respondents at 19–42, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107). 
125  The amici curiae briefs included a submission by Anita Blair, a member of VMI’s Board of Visitors, on 
behalf of groups and individuals including Lynne Cheney, former head of the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, and briefs representing Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, seven 
well-known educators (including David Riesman), several single-sex schools including Wells College, The 
Citadel, and Mary Baldwin College, and the attorney generals of Wyoming and Pennsylvania.  Strum, su-
pra note 3, at 261–63. 
126  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 80, at 33–36. 
127  See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 14 
Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 335 (1992); Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Dis-
crimination, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 699 (1998).  Justice Ginsburg was involved in efforts to elevate the consti-
tutional standard for reviewing sex-based classifications in numerous cases since the Court first began to 
exercise review beyond the traditional “rational basis” test in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).  In Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 71 (1971), Ginsburg had convinced four justices that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard of review.  Markowitz, supra, at 344, n.106.  
128  The ALCU Women’s Rights Project and the National Women’s Law Center submitted an amicus curiae 
brief on behalf of twenty-nine different organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-
Defamation League, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and People for the 
American Way.  Other amici included the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Nancy Mel-
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In a 7-1 decision,129 the Supreme Court concluded that VMI’s exclusion of 
women violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.130  Writing for her-
self and five other Justices, Justice Ginsburg did not mention strict scrutiny, aside from 
observing in a footnote that the most stringent judicial scrutiny is not all that it was once 
cracked up to be.131  Instead, she interwove the now-familiar standard that the challenged 
classification must serve “important governmental objectives” to which the discrimina-
tory means are “substantially related,”132 with language also found in earlier cases that-
suggested that sex-based classifications will fail if they are not supported by an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”133 
 
Since the introduction of  “exceeding persuasive justification” language in Per-
sonnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,134 the place of this language in middle-
tier intermediate review135 had never been clear.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in 
the judgment, stated that the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language was in-
tended as an “observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test” rather than as a 
“formulation of the test itself.”136  In the majority opinion in VMI, however, Justice Gins-
burg appeared to forward the language as the test itself137—indeed, as the “starting point 
of the analysis.”138  In addition, in characterizing the appropriate standard of review, she 
                                                                                                                                                 
lette (the lead plaintiff in The Citadel, after Shannon Faulkner dropped out of the school), and eighteen 
active and retired military officers.  Strum, supra note 3, at 255–61.  
129  Justice Thomas did not participate because his son was a cadet at VMI at the time.  See Strum, supra 
note 3, at 246; Brodie, supra note 6, at 21. 
130  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
131  Id. at 632 n.6 (noting that “last Term observed that strict scrutiny...is not inevitably ‘fatal in fact’”). 
132  Id. at 524, 533 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). 
133  Id. at 524, 529, 530, 531, 533, 534, 545, 546, 556. 
134  442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).  This language also appears in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 
(1981), Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982), Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 
728 (1984), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994). 
135  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications 
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives.”). 
136  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  Rehnquist does not mention J.E.B., 511 U.S. 
127 (1994), but use of the term in that case appears consistent with its use in the other cases he cites.  
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 142 n.12. 
137  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must dem-
onstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”); id. at 534 (“Virginia has shown no ‘ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification’ for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by 
VMI.”). 
138  Kevin N. Rolando, A Decade Later: United States v. Virginia and the Rise and Fall of “Skeptical Scru-
tiny,” 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 182, 207 (2006). 
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introduced a new term—“skeptical scrutiny.”139  Commentators have assumed that these 
words signaled a shift to a new and more rigorous standard in sex discrimination cases.140 
In a 2002 interview, Justice Ginsburg downplayed the shift, stating that the VMI case and 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan were “essentially the same,” with the 7-1 
vote in VMI—as compared to the 5-4 decision in the Mississippi case—showing that “the 
court had learned a lot in those years, between ’82 and ’96.”141  Whatever the Justices 
may have intended when the decision was published in 1996, no case before United 
States v. Virginia, or since, summoned a majority to state the test in such strong terms; 
the case set a heightened, near-strict standard of review, from which subsequent majori-
ties have seemed to withdraw.142 
 
In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg riveted her analysis to the long historical 
narrative of women’s rights litigation—a story Justice Ginsburg knew well from her 
many years as a leading advocate for women’s rights.143  History, she pointed out, has 
disproved stereotypes about women’s proper place in society, women’s ability to thrive 
only in cooperative settings and not in adversarial ones, and outmoded concerns that the 
presence of women in traditionally male pursuits led to the degradation of public norms 
of decency and propriety.144  So, too, history would disprove Virginia’s claim that women 
cannot make the grade at VMI, or would destroy the adversative system that had made 
                                                 
139  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (“Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities 
based on sex responds to volumes of history.”). 
140  See, e.g., Christopher H. Pyle, Women’s Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex Still Justifiable After United 
States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 209, 233 (1997) (opinion came as close as possible to strict scrutiny 
without actually adopting it); Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 
35, 36 (1997) (“[T]he standard applied in VMI is essentially as rigorous as today’s strict scrutiny stan-
dard.”); Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins But Race Loses in Amer-
ica, 6 Mich. J. Gender & L. 153, 214 (1999) (“In VMI ... the Court invented a new test for gender 
classifications that closely resembles the strict scrutiny test of race.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 9, at 73 
(“Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny and brings it closer to the ‘strict scrutiny’ that is applied to dis-
crimination on the basis of race.”).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia charged the Court with raising 
the standard, 518 U.S. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Chief Justice Rehnquist with confusing it, 518 
U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
141  See NPR Morning Edition: Interview by Nina Totenberg with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (National 
Public Radio May 3, 2002), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1142738, 
and transcript, available at 2002 WLNR 13867838. 
142  For an analysis of the Court’s pulling back from the standard described in Virginia, see Rolando, supra 
note 138 (arguing that Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), and 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), all marked the return of tradi-
tional intermediate review analysis in sex discrimination cases).  See also Serena Mayeri, Constitutional 
Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 755, 829–31 (2004) 
(arguing that the difference between “muscular” skeptical scrutiny standard applied in United States v. Vir-
ginia and the impotent version of intermediate scrutiny in Nguyen v. INS shows the malleability of the in-
termediate review standard).  [see memo] 
143  See supra note 128. 
144  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536–45, 556 n.20. 
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VMI unique and valuable.  From this historical standpoint, Virginia’s claims about 
women’s limitations were simply not persuasive.145    
 
Justice Ginsburg also used history to demonstrate that states sometimes trump up 
after-the-fact justifications for measures that restrict women’s opportunities.  Virginia’s 
assertion that VMI’s all-male admissions policy furthered its interest in educational di-
versity was an example.146  Justice Ginsburg’s closer look through an historical lens re-
vealed a tradition of gender stereotypes and exclusion in Virginia’s educational system.  
Women’s seminaries and colleges in Virginia had not been merely separate but also un-
equal to those established for men in terms of resources and stature.147  The state’s justifi-
cation simply didn’t wash.148  Not only was VMI’s exclusion of women based on 
stereotypes about women, but the state’s asserted purpose for VMI was a cover for a de-
sign to reinforce those stereotypes and keep women in their unequal status.   
 
Having concluded that the absence of equal opportunities for women was consti-
tutional defective, the question then remained whether the parallel program for women at 
Mary Baldwin College cured the defect.  Facing this question, the Court had two choices.  
It could have determined that separate, all-male facilities can never be equal—or are in-
herently unequal—as it had held in Brown v. Board of Education with respect to race.149  
It did not do so.  Instead, it proceeded to compare the two programs as if comparability 
was achievable and, under the right circumstances, constitutionally acceptable.150  In 
judging comparability, however, Justice Ginsburg brought the same skepticism to bear on 
the motivation and design of the VWIL program as she had on the exclusion of women 
from VMI.  She found the VWIL solution “reminiscent” of effort by Texas decades ear-
lier to preserve the University of Texas Law School for Whites, by establishing a separate 
school for Blacks.151  The differences between the programs reflected the same stereo-
types that Virginia had deployed in excluding women from VMI initially.152  The aca-
demic programs, facilities, and faculty were pale versions of VMI, and VWIL lacked the 
“unique” adversative barracks experience that was, even by the district court’s account, 
where the “most important aspects of the VMI educational experience occur.”153  
                                                 
145  Id. at 540–43. 
146  Id. at 535–40. 
147  Id. 536–39.    
148  Id. at 539.  For an excellent note on the disputed use of history in the VMI case in the opinions of Jus-
tice Ginsburg, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, see Deborah A. Widiss, Re-Viewing History: 
The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 Yale L.J. 237 (1998). 
149  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
150  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547–54. 
151  Id. at 553–54 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)). 
152  Id. at 550. 
153  Id. at 548–49. 
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While using a demanding standard to evaluate Virginia’s separate programs, Jus-
tice Ginsburg reserved the broader question of whether single-sex schools are constitu-
tional.  Indeed, she appeared sympathetic to the twenty-six single-sex colleges who had 
argued to the Court as amici curiae that single-sex schools can sometimes “dissipate, 
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications.”154  The opinion, however, 
eliminated the single-sex option in this case.  That left two options: VMI could admit 
women, or it could break its ties with the state of Virginia.155  
 
III. Beyond Assimilation: Unconstitutional Maleness? 
 
In United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg combined two separate difficulties 
with sex stereotypes.  First, stereotypes are often inaccurate, allocating opportunities of 
men and women on the basis of false assumptions rather than their actual characteristics.156  
Second, even when stereotypes have some truth to them, use of them can become self-
fulfilling prophecies, thereby reinforcing inequalities between men and women and 
women’s inferior status.157 
 
Because of Justice Ginsburg’s attention to the role of stereotypes in perpetuating 
women’s inferior status, as well as to the problem of false stereotypes, some commentators 
have argued that her jurisprudence is based in an anti-subordination perspective, rather than 
in formal equality.158  Cass Sunstein credits Justice Ginsburg with a “distinctive under-
standing of sex equality” that moves beyond the denial of difference between men and 
women to identifying the problem as one of “second-class citizenship.”159  Yet, even as 
Ginsburg identified the issue of women’s legal, social, and economic inferiority in United 
States v. Virginia, her focus remained on the falseness of assumptions about women’s dif-
                                                 
154  Id. at 533 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a separate, concurring 
opinion, even more explicitly endorsed comparable single-sex programs.  He would not require that these 
programs be as similar as Justice Ginsburg demanded in terms of curriculum and other offerings; it would 
be enough, he suggested, if the two programs “offered the same quality of education and were of the same 
overall caliber.”  Id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
155  Id. at 551, 552, 557.  Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion questions whether the privatization option 
was still available to VMI.  Id. at 596–600 (stating that the majority opinion puts into question all public 
and private single-sex educational programs). 
156  Id. at 541–46. 
157  Id. at 542–43. 
158  For the strong view of this thesis, see Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 770, 782-91 (2010) (ar-
guing that Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence was, from the beginning, grounded in an “antisubordination 
approach” which “guides determination of when and how quality values are implicated”).  See also Cary 
Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming April 2010) (manuscript on file with the author) (maintaining that Justice Ginsburg’s opposi-
tion to gender stereotypes was based on her opposition to the system of restrictive social roles these stereo-
types supported, rather than a narrow, anti-classificationist concept of equal protection).   
159  Sunstein, supra note 9, at 74, 75. 
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ferent learning styles, different physical capacities, and different needs.  This focus was 
sufficient to deciding the case, but in tying the perpetuation of women’s inferiority to 
false stereotypes, it captured only part of the problem with VMI.  In particular, it failed to 
address the way in which VMI actively constructed that inferiority.  For Justice Ginsburg, 
the critical point was that VMI did not prove its claim that women were significantly dif-
ferent from men and would require changes in the adversative method.160  Nothing in her 
analysis challenged the acceptability of the method itself.  
 
Justice Ginsburg’s focus mirrored the government’s position the case.  From the 
beginning, DOJ lawyers focused on VMI’s assumptions about women’s impact on the 
school’s teaching methodology rather than on the legitimacy of that methodology.  The 
federal government’s central strategy sought to disprove VMI’s claim that women were 
different from men and would thus require changes to the unique benefits of the school.  
True to the formal equality paradigm on which this position was based, DOJ lawyers in-
sisted that the women who would be admitted to VMI would be as equally qualified as 
the men admitted to VMI and thus would not affect the purity of the adversative method.  
The method itself was not questioned. 
 
In friendly exchange at oral argument in 1992 before the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Phillips tried to move one of the lawyers, Jessica Silver, be-
yond the government’s attachment to the “no-change” position.  “So what” if the pres-
ence of women caused VMI to alter its method, Judge Phillips pressed Ms. Silver.  Isn’t 
change “just . . . the price you have to pay” for the higher value of equality?161  To Judge 
Phillips, it was not enough to determine whether women would change VMI; the ques-
tion, even assuming women’s entry to the school would change it, was whether the insti-
tution that VMI was trying to preserve had sufficient value to justify women’s exclusion.  
Ms. Silver declined to compromise the government’s thin view of the case, going so far 
as to concede that if it were shown that women would change the institution, VMI would 
not be required to admit them.162  
 
In oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Breyer also seemed to 
recognize that even if women’s presence at VMI would change some of its “unique” fea-
tures, this fact was not dispositive of the case.  Responding to the argument of Virginia’s 
lawyer, former solicitor general Theodore Olson, that the presence of women would re-
quire a change in the adversative method—a method that “works”163—Justice Breyer 
analogized the exclusion of women from VMI to the hypothetical exclusion of other pro-
tected groups: 
 
                                                 
160  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542–43. 
161  George H. Roberts, Jr., The United States of America vs. VMI: Round II, VMI Alumni Rev., Spring 
1992, at 11, 12. The transcript of the Court Circuit argument is no longer available from official sources. 
162  Id. at 12.  The concession was apparently compelled by orders from the Bush administration.  Strum, 
supra note 3, at 193. 
163  Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107). 
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             [C]ouldn’t you say exactly the same thing about ethnic or racial or any 
other [group], I mean somebody could have a school, and they say, we’re keeping 
a [certain] group . . . out .  . . because we have a certain unique kind of education . 
. . and once they’re in . . . they’ll change the nature of [the method] . . . .  
 
I mean, don’t we have to look at the importance of this thing? . . .   
 
Isn’t the answer [to the claim that they’ll change it], so what?  You’d have 
to show that it’s important enough to maintain this adversative process . . .  
 
. . . What is it that is so important about it that enables you to say to a 
woman I’m very sorry, even though you want to go there and you want this result, 
you can’t?164  
 
In questioning the adequacy of the argument that women would change VMI 
enough to justify their exclusion, Justice Breyer seemed to take seriously VMI’s con-
cern—in a way the government’s position did not—that an important “way of life” would 
be lost if the school admitted women.  However, the fact that women might change VMI 
and cause the loss of a way of life did not necessarily justify the preservation of VMI as it 
then existed.  Women could be expected to change VMI, as they had juries, workplaces, 
and police forces, but the possibility of such change did not determine the outcome of the 
case.165  
 
Paul Bender from the Solicitor General’s office, too, recognized that VMI posed  
problems beyond its exclusion of women.  Arguing the case for the United States in the 
Supreme Court, he stated:  
 
What we have here is a single sex institution for men that’s designed as a place to 
teach manly values that only men can learn, to show that men can suffer adversity 
and succeed, and a single sex institution for women . . . that is openly, expressly, de-
liberately designed to teach to women womanly values, feminine values.166  
 
The position taken by DOJ in its briefs did not reflect this critical, substantive di-
mension of the case.  Instead, it froze the constitutional wrong at VMI’s exclusion of 
women, basing its case on an assumption that was so implausible to those who knew VMI 
that some observers charged that the government was trying to destroy VMI, not integrate 
                                                 
164  Id. at 50-52 (emphasis added). 
165  In challenging VMI’s attorneys on the circularity of the uniqueness justification for remaining all-male, 
Justice Souter also goes beyond the descriptive assumptions about women on which VMI’s system is based 
to the normative issues about that system.  Id. at 53 (“[I]f you are going to justify your system by its dis-
tinctness, then you always have a built-in justification . . . and that’s why, it seems to me, under middle tier 
scrutiny, you’ve got to say the distinctness is worth it for some other reason.”). 
166  Id. at 10. 
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it.167  Except in the few passing questions and references summarized above, questions 
about the value of those aspects of VMI used to justify women’s exclusion from the school 
went unasked.   Missing from the government’s arguments, as well as from the Court’s 
analysis, was any recognition that VMI’s absorption of women into the school, “as is,” 
would leave intact the fundamental premises of women’s inferiority that were embedded 
within the school’s design.  The government and the Court both treated VMI as an institu-
tion that had made inaccurate stereotypes about women.  In focusing on the right of women 
to be admitted, the analysis missed that women would be entering an institution that was 
fundamentally hostile to them.168   
 
If the government had pursued the issue of Virginia’s support to an institution that 
furthered a particular version of masculinity that unconstitutionally denigrated women, it 
would have presented evidence more directed to this concern.  Some of the briefs filed on 
appeal suggest the kind of evidence that might have been developed more fully at the trial 
court level.  For example, a group of eighteen active and retired military officers submitted 
an amicus curiae brief arguing that there was no proved relationship between the method 
and the goal of producing citizen-soldiers.  They urged that VMI should be preparing ca-
dets for mixed-gender societies, not all-male ones.169  The brief also criticized the adversa-
                                                 
167  In its brief to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, Mary Baldwin College charged: “It 
seems unlikely that amici such as the ACLU actually believe that the Rat line and 24-hour-a-day military 
regimen at VMI are superior to other educational methodologies and worthy of emulation. Their goal is to 
make VMI change its ways, not to encourage the spread of its methodology.”  Roberts, Case Set for Oral 
Argument, supra note 117, at 20 (citing Brief for Mary Baldwin College as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-1667, 94-1712)); see also Rex 
Bowman, NOW Wants VMI to Ease Physical Tests for Women, Wash. Times, Sept. 24, 1996, at A1 (quot-
ing Anita Blair, member of VMI Board of Visitors, as stating: “We’re literally spending millions of dollars 
for the sake of a handful of broad-shouldered women.  It’s not that they [NOW] want women to have a 
VMI experience, they want to obliterate VMI from the fact of the earth.  That’s what’s so disgusting about 
this.”). 
168  As Valorie Vojdik points out, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis, in comparing VMI to other professions that 
had excluded women, “obscured the power of VMI as an institution and the depth of its hostility toward 
women.” Vojdik, Gender Outlaws, supra note 36, at 107; see also Mary Anne Case, Two Cheers for 
Cheerleading: The Noisy Integration of VMI and the Quiet Success of Virginia Women in Leadership, 1999 
U. Chi. Legal F. 347, 370 (“VMI validates, routinizes and institutionalizes these boys’ worst instincts.”). 
169  Brief of Amicus Curiae Lieutenant Colonel Lt. Col. Rhonda Cornum, USA, et al. in Support of the Peti-
tion of the United States at 12, 14–15, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-
2107) [hereinafter Brief for Cornum].  At oral argument, Justice Scalia seemed impressed with this argu-
ment, even though he thought an all-male VMI was constitutional, noting that “if women are to be leaders 
in life and in the military, then men have got to become accustomed to taking commands from women, and 
men won’t become accustomed to that if women aren’t let in” ).  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
163, at 23.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion concurring with the majority, was also drawn to the logic 
of the brief.  Although otherwise sympathetic to the strengths of VMI, he seemed to wonder whether the ad-
versative system was worth the fight.  “While considerable evidence shows that a single-sex education is 
pedagogically beneficial for some students,” the Chief Justice writes, “there is no similar evidence in the re-
cord that an adversative method is pedagogically beneficial or is any more likely to produce character traits 
than other methodologies.”  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  Although the Chief 
Justice expressed these reservations about the adversative method, he concluded that parallel men’s and 
women’s institutions would be constitutional, even if they used different methods and have different cur-
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tive method on the grounds that the stress it imposed was “artificial” and did not neces-
sarily prepare cadets for real-life or combat stress.170  If the government had chosen a 
broader view of the case, it presumably would also have put in the record further evidence 
of how the adversative method promoted the values of male superiority and female subor-
dination. 
 
With a sufficient showing of the deficiencies of the adversative method, VMI op-
ponents would not have had to concede that VMI could exclude women if their presence 
would change the school, as Jessica Silver suggested in oral argument.171 Instead, a suffi-
cient showing that the school promoted male superiority and female inferiority would 
have strengthened the position that women should be admitted to VMI.  If VMI was un-
constitutionally male, it would have to change, one way or another.  Indeed, an institution 
that continued to promote a “male ethos” should not have continued to receive state sup-
port no matter who was admitted to it.172  
 
If the Court had recognized the constitutional problem with an educational peda-
gogy that degraded women, it also would have been clear that VMI needed guidance 
about how to proceed with gender integration. The assumption that VMI would not 
change with the admission of women made such guidance unnecessary.  But if VMI was 
unconstitutionally promoting male superiority, a remedy would have had to take account 
of those aspects of a VMI education that had this effect, including those features of the 
adversative method that motivated male cadets through an appeal to their desire to domi-
nate women. 
 
Greater consideration of the subordination element of the case also could have led 
to more judicial direction going forward about when and how states can develop single-
sex educational opportunities.  Despite the threat that admitting women from VMI would 
have meant the end of single-sex education everywhere,173 separate programs arguably 
are not a problem if members of both sexes have comparable, voluntary options and are 
equally valued and served —i.e., if the programs do not subordinate women to men.  The 
new generation of single-sex public elementary and secondary schools holds more prom-
ise, in this regard, than single-sex schools that were developed at a time when education 
for women was for a different purpose than education for men and based on countless 
                                                                                                                                                 
riculum, so long as the institutions “offer the same quality of education and [a]re of the same overall cali-
ber.”  Id. at 565. 
170 Brief for Cornum, supra note 169, at 11–12.  
171  See supra text accompanying notes 161–162.  
172  Judge Phillips was pursuing the same issue when he asked the lead Virginia attorney, Robert Patterson, 
whether “fostering a male ethos” would be an appropriate purpose under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Consistent with VMI’s litigation strategy, Patterson deflected the question, saying that there were differ-
ences between men and women that would justify such a purpose.  See Roberts, supra note 161, at 12. 
173  Brief for the Respondents at 17–18, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).  Justice Scalia in 
his dissenting opinion treated this threat as a serious one, stating that the majority opinion put not only pub-
lic single-sex schools in jeopardy, but private ones as well.  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 598–600 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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stereotypes of women’s interests, abilities, and learning styles.  Recently enacted regula-
tions by the U.S. Department of Education under Title IX of the 1972 Education 
Amendments recognize the difference.174  The Court’s majority opinion offers little help 
in determining whether these regulations are constitutional. 
 
The possibility exists that the assimilation strategy was the one most likely to win 
the case and that pushing further into the substantive problems with VMI’s educational 
program would have cost Justice Ginsburg the votes she needed.  Just as an incrementalist 
strategy had succeeded in gaining women access to areas of life from which they were pre-
viously excluded, so perhaps the assertion that the admission of women to VMI would not 
have changed it—if not completely realistic—made the entrance of women to yet another 
male sphere less threatening.  
 
However, the downside of the assimilation ideal should not be taken lightly.  While 
this ideal has helped bring about significant opportunity for women, it also has reinforced 
the notion that the only changes to be expected from gender equality are expanded oppor-
tunities, not changes to institutional structures and societal attitudes.  This message reas-
sures those institutions being asked to accept women, but it also cautions those who would 
integrate them not to expect too much change.175  What came next at VMI bears out these 
limitations. 
 
IV. The Aftermath: Assimilation with Negotiated Accommodations 
 
On June 28, 1996, two days after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Virginia, The Citadel announced that it would begin accepting women applicants.176  Co-
education would not happen as quickly at VMI.  Board members studied the viability of 
privatization to enable VMI to remain all-male, while the VMI administration also pre-
                                                 
174  These regulations offer considerable flexibility for school districts to develop single-sex elementary and 
secondary programs. They require that such programs be voluntary, even-handed, subject to periodic 
evaluations, and with a purpose either to promote diversity, or to respond to a specific educational need. 
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Finan-
cial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106); Access to Classes 
and Schools, 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2009).  For a discussion of these and other guidelines, and of the likely 
constitutionality of these regulations, see Rebecca A. Kiselewich, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regula-
tions for Single-Sex Public Education: How Separate Can be Equal, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 217 (2008); Benjamin 
O. Carr, Can Separate Be Equal? Single-Sex Classrooms, The Constitution, and Title IX, 83 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 409 (2007); Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex 
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1953 (2006).  Single-sex programs in public 
schools have multiplied since United States v. Virginia.  In 1995, there were three public high schools with 
all-female student bodies.  The National Association for Public Single-Sex Education reports that in the 
2005–2006 academic year, forty-four public elementary and secondary schools in the United States were 
single-sex, thirteen of which opened or became single-sex that year. Jenkins, supra, at 1957. 
175  There are already many reasons why the introduction of women and minorities to workplaces has not 
made those workplaces significantly more hospitable to women and minorities.  See Devon W. Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1645 (2004). 
176  Strum, supra note 3, at 298. 
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pared to admit women.  The school’s Superintendent Major General Josiah Bunting III 
understood that the privatization option probably would not work, but he also realized 
that a substantial segment of the VMI community preferred a private, all-male option to a 
public coeducational institution and thought that point of view deserved a full hearing.  
At the same time, he determined that if VMI were to accept females, it needed to start 
early to plan it right.177  He was not prepared to fail.  “[I]f we’re going to do it,” Bunting 
told the Board, “We’re going to do it well—extraordinarily well.”178  
 
Bunting’s caution would turn out to produce a more successful integration of 
women at VMI than occurred at The Citadel,179 but the slower pace also created substan-
tial tension between VMI and the DOJ who, along with representatives of some of the 
women’s groups who had participated in the litigation, accused VMI of stalling.180  VMI 
committees worked through the summer months on parallel tracks to develop both a pri-
vatization plan and a plan to integrate women.181  On September 10th, believing that VMI 
was not moving fast enough to integrate, DOJ filed an emergency motion in the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals demanding that women be admitted immediately.182  
 
On September 21, 1996, while this motion was pending, the VMI Board of Visitors, 
by a 9-8 vote, passed a resolution to accept women, beginning in August of 1997.183  An 
important factor in the decision was that privatlization would require VMI to raise $250–
$300 million in endowment, or the equivalent of expected return on this amount on an an-
nual basis, to replace its state and federal subsidies184—this after VMI alumni had already 
                                                 
177  Id. at 298–99. 
178  Brodie, supra note 6, at 49.  General Bunting lost support among some alumni, who felt he should have 
resigned as a matter of principle when VMI was ordered to admit women, rather than submit to the Court’s 
order.  Bunting Speech Ended on Losing Note, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 13, 2001, at C2. 
179  By all accounts, the introduction of women at The Citadel, with little study or planning, was a disaster.  
Shannon Faulkner, admitted by court order in 1995, left within a week due to the stress and isolation of 
being the only woman at the college.  Two of the four women who followed after her were taunted and 
beaten by male cadets, who set the women’s clothes on fire while they were still wearing them.  See Asso-
ciated Press, F.B.I. Looking into Report of Hazing at Citadel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1996, § 1, at 8.  
180  Strum, supra note 3, at 299–300. 
181  VMI communications with alumni made it clear that the privatization option had been under study for 
some time and that consideration of the privatization and coeducation possibilities would be considered 
simultaneously.  See Supreme Court Rules in Favor of United States, VMI: The Institute Report (Virginia 
Military Institute, Lexington, Va.), Sept. 11, 1996, at 1, 6. 
182  Emergency Motion of Respondent-Appellant, Virginia, 96 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 91-1690, 94-
1667, and 94-1712). 
183  The VMI Board of Visitors Renders Historic Decision Not to Pursue Privatization, VMI Alumni Rev., 
Winter 1997, at 14, 15–16; Wes Allison, VMI Votes 9-8 to Admit Women: Some Alumni Weep; Officials 
Promise Survival, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1996, at A1. 
184  See George H. Roberts, Jr., The Issues Before the Board, VMI Alumni Rev., Winter 1997, at 44, 45  
(estimating a cost of $170–$300 million); Calvin R. Trice, Bunting Speech Ended on Losing Note, Rich-
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paid more than $14 million in legal fees, public relations, and payments to VWIL.185  In 
addition, then-Governor George Allen expressed some concern that privatization would 
make VMI a civil rights pariah.186  Moreover, the Department of Defense had made clear 
that it intended to terminate the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) program at 
VMI unless it submitted a remedial plan to integrate women.187 
 
With the decision made, General Bunting himself set an extraordinarily positive 
tone of professionalism and commitment to making gender integration succeed.  “When 
you are given a lawful order,” he stated in an interview, “you must execute it.  Profes-
sionals may not allow their resentments to affect their work.”188  He understood, at least 
among “home” audiences, that creating and maintaining this attitude throughout the 
school would take some doing.  “We will have to effect a cultural change, an attitudinal 
change, many of us in ourselves,” he told the Board.  “[D]oubt, skepticism, cynicism, sor-
row are not fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of a new coeducational VMI. ... Heal-
ing and building will have to occur simultaneously.”189  Although Bunting would 
continue privately to take the position that VMI should not have been required to admit 
women,190 he proceeded to make decisions designed to make the integration of women as 
successful as possible, promising that “none of the individual women will be made to feel 
any more unwelcome than any of the young men.”191 
 
The one area in which Bunting let his resentment show was in his continuing, ad-
versarial dealings with the DOJ.  Throughout the course of the planning for the admission 
of women, which was to be officially supervised by Judge Kiser,192 ongoing disputes per-
sisted about what accommodations would be made.  Early on, both sides altered the posi-
tions they had held during litigation.  While VMI had claimed during the litigation that 
                                                                                                                                                 
mond Times-Dispatch, May 13, 2001, at C2 (stating that “the school would have needed an immediate 
$250 million in cash” to go private). 
185  Strum, supra note 3, at 298. 
186  Alumni Present Case for Making VMI Private, Akron Beacon J., Sept. 21, 1996, at A4. 
187  See Letter from Fred Pang, Assistant Sec’y of Def., to Major General Josiah Bunting III, Superinten-
dent, VMI (Sept. 16, 1996); Letter from William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorney General, Commonwealth of 
Va., to Fred Pang, Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Oct. 4, 1996); Letter of Judith A. Miller, Attorney, on behalf of 
the Dep’t of Def., to William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorney General, Commonwealth of Va. (Nov. 5, 1996), 
published in VMI Alumni Rev., Winter 1997, at 28; see also Strum, supra note 3, at 298.  [see memo] 
188  Strum, supra note 3, at 303 (citing Katherine Gazella, VMI: No Longer Just for Men, St. Petersburg 
Times, Aug. 18, 1997, at 1A). 
189  Brodie, supra note 6, at 49. 
190  He continues to take that position.  Interview with Major General Josiah Bunting III, supra note 12. 
191  Strum, supra note 3, at 303 (citing Gazella, supra note 188). “We must simply demonstrate that the 
VMI way is the honorable, professional, efficient, self-controlled way,” said Bunting in December 1996. 
The female cadets “are the beneficiaries, not the makers, of the School’s new, coeducational, era.”  Brodie, 
supra note 6, at 170. 
192  United States v. Virginia, 96 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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the admission of women would require so many changes that the school would lose what 
made it valuable, it now insisted that female cadets would be treated exactly the same as 
males.193 Conversely, while DOJ had insisted during the litigation that no significant 
changes would be needed to accommodate women, advocates for the potential female 
cadets immediately began talking about the need to permit women to have longer haircuts 
and lighter physical requirements, calling the intention to shave women’s heads “vindic-
tive” and criticizing the “total equality” approach announced by General Bunting as “just 
an excuse to exclude women.”194  In its October 17, 1996, motion to the district court to 
compel VMI to develop a detailed coeducation plan, DOJ asked the court to require VMI 
to remove from all promotional materials items that could discourage women from at-
tending VMI, to substitute more encouraging images, and to make adjustments to the rat 
line traditions.195 
 
From the beginning, the parties squabbled about how much detail VMI would 
have to supply to the DOJ about the transition plan.  Bunting resisted providing the kind 
of specific plans demanded by DOJ, believing that the government’s effort to ascertain 
and supervise every facet of the plan was an attempt to remake VMI in the image of the 
federal service academies.  DOJ’s mistrust of VMI and its attempt to supervise the proc-
ess of admitting women, Bunting said, “is a direct challenge to our independence and our 
honor and, I may add, our professionalism.”196  With a politician’s instincts, however, 
Bunting communicated extensively with alumni and friends both about VMI’s prepara-
tions for women and about its refusal to comply with all federal requests for informa-
tion.197 
 
                                                 
193  From the starting gate, VMI resolved to make changes that were “absolutely minimal.”  Major General 
Josiah Bunting III, Superintendent, VMI, Public Remarks at Press Conference (Sept. 21, 1996), reported in 
The VMI Board of Visitors Renders Historic Decision, supra note 183, at 17 (reporting Bunting’s statement 
that “[f]emale cadets will be treated precisely as we treat male cadets”); see also Strum, supra note 3, at 
304. [see memo] 
194  See Strum, supra note 3, at 304 (citing news stories); Bowman, supra note 167. 
195  Virginia, 96 F.3d 114 (Nos. 91-1690, 94-1667 and 94-1712) (order remanding case to district court);   
George H. Roberts, Jr., Legal Proceedings Continue, VMI Alumni Rev., Winter 1997, at 48, 49.  Even after 
women were admitted, DOJ continued to try to supervise the transition.  For example, when the first 
woman was suspended for punching an upperclassman, the Justice Department, unsuccessfully, attempted 
to investigate whether any allegations of sexual harassment were involved.  See Matt Chittum, VMI Super-
intendent Pleads for ‘Source of Sanity’: Feds Want More Details on Suspended Female Rat, Roanoke 
Times, Sept. 26, 1997, at B1; Brodie, supra note 6, at 272; see also Jamie C. Ruff, Judge Won’t End VMI 
Oversight Yet: U.S., State Debated Issue of Progress, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Apr. 17, 1999, at B1 (re-
porting refusal of trial judge to end supervision). [see memo] 
196  Associated Press, VMI Co-ed Plan Draws Justice Ire, The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC), Nov. 14, 
1996, at A4; see also Allison Blake, State Pans Justice for Poking VMI; Feds: Let Women Apply Now, 
Roanoke Times, Sept. 19, 1996, at A1 (reporting charges by Virginia’s assistant state attorney general, Wil-
liam Hurd, that the federal government was trying to “hound and harass” VMI). [see memo] 
197  See Brodie, supra note 6, 186–89.  These communications, many of which are found in the VMI 
Alumni Review, are available from VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, 
Va. 
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On December 2, 1996, in response to the DOJ motion for a detailed integration 
plan, Judge Kiser acknowledged that VMI had not yet submitted a formal plan, but it 
noted that VMI had taken a number of steps toward the integration of women, including 
recruitment efforts, facilities changes, program development, financial aid, and the hiring 
of necessary personnel.  It also noted that the instructions from the appellate court did not 
require that Virginia get prior approval of a plan of action.  Clearly impatient with both 
sides, Judge Kiser wrote that the government’s claim that VMI was dragging its feet was 
overstated, but that “had the United States been kept informed as to what Virginia was 
doing to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court, the present motion would not 
have been necessary.”198  
 
VMI continued giving DOJ less detail than it asked for, but it did proceed to file 
comprehensive, quarterly reports with the court.199  DOJ continued to oversee VMI’s 
processes, which continued to irritate VMI.  For example, DOJ forbade direct contact 
with the federal service academies without its permission—contact that might have been 
able to provide useful information about what had worked at other institutions—on the 
grounds that VMI was still a party to a federal lawsuit and the federal academies were 
also DOJ clients.200  
 
One of Bunting’s earliest decisions was putting then-Colonel Mike Bissell in charge 
of the planning process for the integration of women at VMI.  Bissell had been serving as 
the commandant of cadets at VMI (equivalent to the dean of students at many colleges) and 
also as the commandant of VWIL, coordinating the two colleges’ programs.201  Bissell be-
came chair of an executive committee consisting of seven subcommittee heads, seven ca-
dets, and a few specialists.  He established subcommittees, made up of faculty, staff, 
alumni, and cadets, to examine issues relating to the recruitment of women, facilities, aca-
demics, athletics, orientation, public relations, and co-curricular activities.  The inclusion of 
more than 100 cadets on the varying transition teams recognized the importance of buy-in 
from the student body, as well as from faculty and staff.202 
 
True to Bunting’s word, much of VMI was to stay the same.  Its leaders were keen 
on preserving the harshness of the adversative method; it was the abandonment of that 
method and the development of a less aggressive style of leadership, many believed, that 
had led the federal academies to go down the slippery slope into a “feel good” but less ef-
                                                 
198  United States v. Virginia, No. 90-126, memorandum op. at 7 (W.D. Va. Dec. 2, 1996); see also Strum, 
supra note 3, at 303–05. 
199  See, e.g., The Third Quarterly Report to the United States District Court from the Commonwealth of 
Virginia and its Public Co-Defendants, May 1997, reprinted in VMI Alumni Rev., Summer 1997, at 144–
49. 
200  Brodie, supra note 6, at 46; Blake, supra note 196. 
201  Strum, supra note 3, at 305. 
202  Id. at 305. 
 THE STORY OF UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA 
 
fective military.203  Phyllis Schlafy, a member of the VMI Board of directors, wrote to VMI 
alumni: “VMI Alumni, if you allow Ginsburg et al. to do to VMI what Pat Schroeder et al. 
have done to the United States Navy, you are not the exemplars of manhood we thought 
you were.”204 
 
Accordingly, the same physical fitness test requirements would apply to VMI 
women, in contrast to the federal service academies, which adjusted physical requirements 
for females.205  Physical education requirements were also to remain the same, with the ex-
ception that female cadets would participate in boxing and wrestling separately, rather than 
with the male cadets.206  A twice-a-week endurance test of ropes course, wall climbing, and 
obstacle courses, known as the “rat challenge,” was kept the same except for the addition of 
ramps at a few high obstacles.207  
 
Small adjustments were made to the dress and appearance rules.  Bunting initially 
announced that women were to get the same “buzz cuts” as men,208 but after much back 
and forth, women rats were left with an one-eighth-inch longer hair style than men.209  Men 
and women would wear the same uniforms, except that the female uniforms were tailored.   
Jewelry remained prohibited for rats, although after breakout, women could wear single 
gold-post earrings (not more than one-eighth-inch in diameter) for occasions other than 
parades, inspections, or athletics—an allowance that brought complaints from some male 
                                                 
203  Brodie, supra note 6, at 41; see also id. at 50 (quoting Bunting, “I am not especially impressed that 
other military schools, since coeducation, have abandoned their adversative systems. We are VMI and we 
will go our own way as we always have”). 
204  Id. at 58–59 
205  Id. at 146–58.  The VMI Fitness Test (“VFT”) requires at a minimum sixty sit-ups in two minutes, five 
pull-ups, and a one-and-one-half mile run in twelve minutes.  Passing the test is not required for graduation, 
and many male graduates do not pass it, but it counts as 25% of a cadet’s physical education grade for each 
of eight required physical education courses, all of which a cadet must pass to graduate.  Cadets with low 
course grades and failing VFT scores have had to repeat the classes, but if the grades are otherwise high 
enough, a student may end up graduating without ever having passed the test.  See id. at 148–49.  At the 
end of the first year of coeducation, 96% of men had passed the pull-up requirement, as compared to 30% 
of women; 97.5% of men had passed the running requirement, as compared to 85% of women, and women 
averaged seventy-eight sit-ups in the time period while men averaged seventy-six.  Id. at 329–30.  The de-
cision to keep the fitness requirements the same was made even though the Board of Visitors had suggested 
it would authorize adjustments to these requirements.  Id. at 68. 
206  Strum, supra note 3, at 307–08. 
207  Brodie, supra note 6, at 160–61. 
208  Strum, supra note 3, at 304. 
209  Women were left with one-inch cuts on top, as compared to one-half inch for men, and three-eighths 
inch on the sides, as compared to a trace amount for men.  Strum, supra note 3, at 313.  General Bunting, 
when asked about the different length haircuts, is said to have responded through his spokesman, “Tell 
them the difference is not worth worrying about.”  Peter Finn, Year of the Female Rat: 30 Women Enroll at 
VMI, All-Male Since 1839, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1997, at D1. 
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cadets, who wished to be able to do the same.210  “Conservative” cosmetics, including 
“noneccentric lipstick” and colorless nail polish, were allowed for social occasions that 
required more formal dress than the uniform worn in the classroom.211  The school issued 
grey and white skirts to women for social engagements, but they were deemed so unat-
tractive that most women did not wear them.  A minor controversy occurred one year 
when a woman began wearing one of the skirts to class, and was “boned” for improper 
attire.212  
 
Some concessions to women were defended explicitly on the ground that they were 
necessary to make women’s experience as similar to men’s as possible.  For example, fe-
male exchange students were recruited from Norwich Academy and Texas A&M to pro-
vide dykes to mentor the new female rats.213  Some changes were clearly for the benefit of 
the men and the school itself.  Female cadets who looked like men created some awkward 
public relations moments for the school, including women being mistaken for men at pub-
lic ceremonies and being ejected from public restrooms.214  There was also concern that too 
masculine a look might attract the “wrong sort of women” to VMI.215  On some matters, 
other forces intervened.  For example, at one point the Department of Defense suggested 
that giving women the same buzz cuts as men might constitute institutional harassment and 
that it would consider threatening VMI’s ROTC program if it did so.216 
 
The VMI administration also made some adjustments for women in the barracks.  
Female cadets would live in the barracks, without locks on the doors, but shades were 
added to the windows of all rooms—men’s and women’s—and could be pulled down 
                                                 
210  Brodie, supra note 6, at 132–33.  Other than this accommodation, no jewelry except watches was al-
lowed before breakout; after breakout, cadets could wear one ring on each hand and a religious symbol or 
military dog tags around the neck, out of view. 
211  Id. at 133 
212  Id. at 133–35. 
213  Brodie, supra note 6, at 90, 302–04.  Similarly, advocates argued for longer haircuts for women on the 
ground that buzz cuts had a different, more humiliating meaning for women than for men, and that 
Bunting’s initial position that women should have to have the same buzz cuts as men was vindictive and an 
effort to use the ”myth of total equality”as a way of excluding women.  Strum, supra note 3, at 304 
(quoting Val Vojdik, Shannon Faulkner’s lawyer in The Citadel case, and Karen Johnson, a retired air force 
colonel who was vice president of the National Organization for Women).  
214  Brodie, supra note 6, at 279–80. 
215  Id. at 281. 
216  Id. at 128. For the symbolic importance all interested parties placed in the length of women’s haircuts, 
see id. at 127–132, 221–22, 280–86.  In the first semester of women’s admission, two women cadets were 
among about ninety cadets punished for shaving their heads.  VMI Cadets Punished, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 
1997, at D4. 
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when dressing.217  Women would have toilet stalls218 and individual showers,219 and their 
arrival also inspired private examining rooms at the post hospital.  Security lighting and 
emergency call boxes would be installed around the post.220  
 
Men benefited from some of these changes, in addition to the window shades and 
the private examining rooms at the hospital.  When administrators lengthened the length 
of time for showers for female rats from thirty to ninety seconds to ten minutes suppos-
edly for hygienic reasons, complaints of preferential treatment by male rats led to ten-
minute showers for them as well.221  As part of the negotiations over women’s swimwear, 
men bargained for a more popular boxer-style suit, to replace the tight-fitting briefs that 
previously had been required.222  In 1999, the first class (seniors) recommended a change 
in breakout; instead of climbing the cold, muddy, steep hill, there would be a forced 
march to New Market, followed by a re-enactment of the Civil War charge of their 
predecessors.  Some saw these and other changes as dilutions of the VMI experience, and 
blamed them on the presence of women, even when the two were not related.223  Feeding 
this resentment were continual grumblings in some quarters that women were afforded 
preferential treatment.224  
                                                 
217  Brodie, supra note 6, at 110–11, 119.  The shades went up on both men’s and women’s Barracks 
rooms, although by the end of the first month of the 1997–1998 school year, many of them had fallen down 
from misuse. Id. at 110–11.  [see memo]CORRECT 
218  The absence of toilet stall doors was apparently not an intentional part of the lack of privacy philosophy 
at VMI.  Before the admission of women to VMI, the stalls had had doors, but they had been torn off so 
many times that the maintenance workers simply stopped replacing them. Once the female cadets had doors 
installed, however, the male cadets insisted on them as well.  Id. at 111. 
219  Agonized attention was given to the issue of individual showers, with some worrying about the danger 
of blood pathogens during menstruation, and others believing that women would not clean themselves 
properly if they were not given privacy during a shower.  Id. at 112–13. 
220  Strum, supra note 3, at 306; Brodie, supra note 6, at 119–22. 
221  Brodie, supra  note 6, at 236. 
222  Id. at 137. 
223  Case, supra note 168, at 373; Brodie, supra note 6, at 347–48.  An extreme version of this sentiment is 
represented in the effort by 1977 VMI graduate Michael Guthrie to start a new school modeled on the old 
VMI.  Without any support or encouragement from VMI, within a year after VMI’s decision to admit 
women, Guthrie incorporated the Southern Military Institute (SMI).  The mission of SMI is to build an all-
male, Christian four-year military college, modeled after the original VMI and The Citadel, where “South-
ern traditions that have been tarnished and almost lost will live again.” Southern Military Institute, at 
http://www.south-mil-inst.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).  As of 2006, property for the school had still not 
been acquired.  Bill Poovey, Military School for Men Planned: Southerners Want Traditions Revived, 
Comm. Appeal (Memphis, TN), Sept. 21, 2003, at A12; see also Wikipedia, Southern Military Institute, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Military_Institute (last visited Jul. 24, 2008). 
224  Interview with Katherine Stevens, VWIL cadet, in Staunton, Va. (June 12, 2008).  One issue was that 
NCAA athletes are exempt from the rat challenge and some workouts, and that more women (48%) are on 
NCAA permits than men (31%).  Such exemptions caused some resentment at the school even before 
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One difficult matter concerned the gendered terminology at the school.  In keep-
ing with the intention to assimilate women—not change the institution—female first-year 
students would be “brother rats.”  Bunting ordered that terms like “dyke,” “bone,” and 
“running a period” would stay.225  The administration neither official endorsed nor disap-
proved other familiar phrases, such as “raping your virgin ducks” (peeling apart the 
stiffly starched legs of a new pair of white trousers) and the more recently coined “rolling 
your hay tight as a tampon” (rolling up your thin mattress in the morning).226  Adminis-
trators made some effort to reduce the level of gendered vulgarities and obscenities that 
had made the rat line a form of play-acting the raping and humiliation of women227 and at 
one point sanded away the gender profanities etched in the wooden desks.228  
 
Dating was forbidden of any rat, and upperclassmen were not allowed to date 
anyone in their chain of command.229  In the first year of women’s presence at VMI, a 
male and female cadet were disciplined for sexual contact.  The student Executive Com-
mittee recommended suspension for both students, but the school administration reduced 
the punishment to penalty tours and confinement to barracks.  Later in the year, a couple 
was expelled for a similar offense.230  Pregnancy was also an issue. Initially, the school 
ordered that pregnancy would be cause for dismissal for both a pregnant cadet and a male 
cadet who caused the pregnancy of another cadet.231  When the first woman cadet became 
pregnant, however, pressure from DOJ and from women’s advocate groups—including 
the National Women’s Law Center, who claimed that this approach would be unconstitu-
tional—led to a new policy allowing pregnant cadets to remain in the corps as long as 
their condition did not prohibit them from fulfilling their duties.232  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
women were admitted.  See Brodie, supra note 6, at 161; Superintendent’s Report to the Board of Visitors, 
Feb. 1999 (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.). 
225  Brodie, supra note 6, at 74–79.  Despite the commonly understood meanings of these and other terms, 
their origins could, mostly, be explained in non-sexual terms.  “The words are hardy old VMI words,” said 
General Bunting. “They are not to be excised from the Rat Bible, etc., during my time as Superintendent.” 
Id. at 75–79 (emphasis in original). 
226  Id. at 80–81. 
227  Id. at 80–83. 
228  Strum, supra note 3, at 306.  Some of the graffiti reappeared.  One favorite phrase soon found on class-
room desks and barracks walls was “2000 LCWB” (“Last Class With Balls”).  Brodie, supra note 6, at 254. 
229  Brodie, supra note 6, at 139. 
230  Strum, supra note 3, at 314.    
231 Brodie, supra note 6, at 143. 
232  Associated Press, Pregnant VMI Cadet Will Stay in School: Rule Prohibits Her From Getting Married, 
Daily Press (Newport News, VA), Feb. 17, 2001, at B4; Associated Press, VMI Rule Would Force Preg-
nant Cadets Out, Daily Press (Newport News, VA), July 2, 2001, at C2; Daniel F. Drummond, Pregnancy 
Policy May Cost VMI Federal Aid: Justice Says Plan Violates Title IX, Wash. Times, July 4, 2001, at A1. 
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All cadets and staff had to attend workshops on sexual harassment and hazing, and 
twenty cadets, staff, and faculty were trained to deal with complaints of sexual harass-
ment.233  Some women believed that hostility decreased as time went on,234 but expressions 
of hostility toward the women continued.235  In fact, some reported that negativity seemed 
to increase after the first year, possibly because the effort to prime the student leadership to 
accept responsibility for the successful integration of women could not be sustained year 
after year at the same level of intensity.236  In the third year of coeducation, four women 
left after Christmas break, one claiming that she experienced harassment, received a death 
threat, and was harassed constantly about her weight.237  As women became upperclass-
men, rats would sometimes ignore them or refuse to do push-ups when asked.  One re-
ported being told, “My dyke told me I don’t have to pay attention to women.”238  
 
Everyone always understood that the entry of women could not succeed with only 
a handful of women.239  Attracting enough women at VMI to have a “critical mass” has 
been a challenge.240  As a result of extraordinary recruitment efforts,241 the school ma-
triculated thirty or more women in the first two years of coeducation, including the up-
per-class transfers recruited from Norwich Academy and Texas A&M, but only twenty-
four to twenty-eight women entered each of the following three classes.242  With in-
creased recruitment efforts, however, female enrollment at VMI rose to forty-four in 
                                                 
233  Strum, supra note 3, at 308; Brodie, supra note 6, at 226–27. 
234  See Brodie, supra note 6, at 354–55. 
235  See, e.g., id., at 225, 253–55, 348, 356 (noting incidents reported).  One of the hardest incidents for 
VMI came when its top-ranking cadet at the school was apprehended using his position to pressure female 
rats for sex.  He was expelled.  See Josh White, Top Cadet Expelled From VMI: Sexual Harassment Al-
leged by 2 Women, Wash. Post, June 27, 1999, at C1. 
236  Angelica Martinez, VMI Loses Four Females Over Furlough, The Cadet, Feb. 4, 2000, at 1. 
237  See Calvin R. Trice, Hostility Lessens as Time Goes By, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 13, 2001, at 
C1; see also supra note 37. 
238  See Trice, supra note 237.  
239  Brodie, supra note 6, at 87–89; Interview with Major General Josiah Bunting, supra note 12. 
240  One dean speculated in 2003 that the best VMI can hope for is a corps that is 10% female.  See Matt 
Chittum, Record-Setting Number of Women Join VMI’s Ranks: School Spent Six Years and Millions of Dol-
lars Trying to Bar Women, Roanoke Times, Aug. 28, 2003, at A1; Conley, supra note 19. 
241  Brodie, supra note 6, at 91. 
242  Id. at 90, 302–04; Calvin R. Trice, Strong Growth and Growing Pains: Women Flock to VWIL But Fe-
male Enrollment Has Leveled Off at VMI, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 25, 2001, at B1.  Of the origi-
nal group of thirty recruits, nineteen made it to graduation.  Four were transfer students who graduated in 
1999 and 2000; fourteen graduated in 2001.  Of the eleven who didn’t graduate, two were expelled for 
honor-code violations and one was suspended for hitting an upperclassman.  The others resigned for vari-
ous reasons, not all of them related to the harshness of the place.  Bill Lohmann, VMI’s Rigor a Lasting 
Lesson for First Women, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 23, 2007, at A1. 
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT  
 
2003,243 just over fifty in 2005, and forty-seven in 2007.244  It appears, consistent with the 
assimilation ideal, that these women were not crusaders seeking to change the institution 
from within, but women who wanted the same physical and mental challenges as VMI 
men.245 
 
At the same time, enrollment in the VWIL program at Mary Baldwin College has 
been consistently higher than that of female enrollment at VMI—sometimes more than 
double.  Since the program was started in 1995, at least forty-two cadets have entered 
VWIL each year.  In 2001, while twenty-four freshmen women matriculated at VMI, 
fifty-two came to VWIL.246  In 2005, again, VWIL had twice the number of female ca-
dets as VMI did.247  
 
VWIL graduates are succeeding, by some measures more than the female gradu-
ates of VMI.  For example, in May 2008, fourteen of the nineteen women who graduated 
from the VWIL program were to be commissioned in the Air Force, Army, or Marine 
Corps,248 a higher figure than the typical 40% figure averaged by VMI graduates, both 
male and female.249  VWIL women are serving in the military with distinction.250  Vir-
ginia continues to support VWIL, even though the program did not serve its original pur-
pose of saving VMI’s all-male status.251 
 
                                                 
243  Chittum, supra note 240. 
244  Conley, supra note 19. 
245  Interview with Major General Josiah Bunting, supra note 12 (women who came to VMI are not radical 
feminists). See also Lindsay Kastner, VMI Grad Doesn’t See Herself as a Pioneer, Richmond Times-
Dispatch, June 6, 2001, at N4 (citing female student who said that she and other women who entered VMI 
were not crusaders trying to tear down an all-male tradition); Conley, supra  note 19 (quoting female stu-
dent, “I had absolutely no desire to change VMI or be a poster child for feminists in America”).  [see 
memo] 
246  Trice, supra note 242. 
247  Matt Chittum, Decade Strong Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership, Roanoke Times, March 18, 
2005, at A1. 
248  VWIL Grads Attain Record Commissions, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 2008, at A10. 
249  See Conley, supra note 19.  The goal at VMI is a 70% commission rate.  Id. 
250  Air Force Special Agent Captain Kristy Wheeler received a Bronze Star in 2008 for her work in Iraq 
supervising the transport of troops and equipment.  Brad Zinn, VWIL Grad Awarded Bronze Star, The 
Daily News Leader (Staunton, VA), Apr. 6, 2008, at 1A.  In September 2005, VWIL suffered its first ser-
vice casualty when a graduate died in combat in the Middle East. Calvin R. Trice, Mary Baldwin Grad 
Killed While Serving in Military, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 21, 2005, at B4. 
251  The State of Virginia continues to support the program in the form of tuition subsidies, at the level of 
about $750,000 annually, Chittum, supra note 247, although it has terminated its additional allotment to 
VWIL under the Unique Military Appropriation.  Interview with Brigadier General Mike Bissell, in Staun-
ton, Va. (June 12, 2008).  VMI provided $2.3 million of its $6.9 million commitment to endow the VWIL 
program before pulling its funding.  Trice, supra note 242. 
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Such success might suggest that VWIL is, indeed, more compatible with women’s 
style of learning and leadership than VMI.  Some have gone further, suggesting that the 
VWIL program is a better program not only for training women but men as well.252  
VWIL’s successes, however, do not appear to have influenced the way VMI operates. 
Given the seriousness with which VMI took the integration of women when required by 
law to do so, one has to wonder how it would have responded to an order not only to ad-
mit women but to eliminate the ethos of male superiority at VMI.   
 
V. Epilogue 
 
On December 6, 2001, Judge Kiser entered an order that VMI had met all the ob-
ligations required by the federal courts in bringing women into the student body and the 
case could now be closed.253  Bunting’s reaction to this order reflected both how much, 
and how little, the case had achieved.  He called the order “a vindication of many years of 
dedication and hard work.”  “We are pleased we were able to conclude this case,” he said 
in a statement,” without compromising the institute’s core values.”254  
                                                 
252  Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate but Equal, or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of 
Plessy v. Ferguson and Gender Discrimination, 12 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1089, 1105 (1996); Case, supra note 
168, at 349; see also Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Ef-
feminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 103–04 (1995) (discussing the pos-
sibility of opening up VWIL to men). 
253  United States v. Virginia, No. 90-0126, order (W.D. Va. Dec. 6, 2001). 
254  Calvin R. Trice, U.S. Judge Tells VMI: “At Ease”; Book Closed on All-Male Policy Suit, Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, Dec. 8, 2001, at A1. 
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